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ABSTRACT	  
THE	  INFLUENCE	  OF	  DISCRETE	  EMOTIONAL	  STATES	  ON	  PREFERENTIAL	  CHOICE	  	  MAY	  2016	  	  ANDREA	  M.	  CATALDO,	  B.A.,	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  MASSACHUSETTS	  AMHERST	  	  M.S.,	  UNIVERSITY	  OF	  MASSACHUSETTS	  	  Directed	  by:	  Andrew	  Cohen	  	  Past	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  emotion	  affects	  preferential	  choice	  outcomes.	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  present	  study	  was	  to	  further	  research	  on	  emotion	  and	  preferential	  choice	  by	  using	  mathematical	  modeling	  to	  investigate	  the	  effects	  of	  specific	  dimensions	  of	  emotion	  on	  the	  underlying	  mechanisms	  of	  preferential	  choice.	  Specifically,	  we	  aimed	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  concurrent	  effects	  of	  positive-­‐negative	  valence	  and	  situational	  certainty	  on	  attention	  and	  information	  accumulation	  threshold,	  respectively,	  would	  influence	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect,	  a	  robust	  phenomenon	  in	  preferential	  choice.	  Participants	  first	  underwent	  either	  an	  Anger	  (negative	  and	  certain),	  Fear	  (negative	  and	  uncertain),	  or	  no	  (Control)	  emotion	  manipulation.	  All	  participants	  then	  completed	  an	  apartment	  choice	  task	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  elicit	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  A	  novel	  framing	  manipulation	  was	  used	  to	  test	  the	  effects	  of	  emotional	  valence	  on	  attention.	  Both	  feature	  framing	  and	  emotion	  condition	  significantly	  affected	  choice	  outcomes.	  These	  results	  suggest	  differences	  in	  deliberation	  style	  between	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  participants,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  surprising	  impact	  of	  alternatives	  outside	  the	  choice	  set	  on	  choice	  outcomes.	  Future	  directions	  are	  discussed.	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CHAPTER	  1	  	  
EMOTION	  AND	  PREFERENTIAL	  CHOICE	  
1.1	  Introduction	  Decision-­‐making	  is	  a	  complex	  cognitive	  process	  in	  which	  a	  selection	  must	  be	  made	  from	  a	  set	  of	  alternatives.	  Preferential	  choice	  is	  a	  specific	  decision-­‐making	  scenario	  that	  consists	  of	  choosing	  between	  multiple	  alternatives	  associated	  with	  known	  outcomes;	  for	  instance,	  choosing	  between	  apartments	  with	  known	  features	  such	  as	  size	  and	  location.	  It	  has	  been	  shown	  that	  the	  outcome	  of	  this	  process	  likely	  depends	  on	  the	  performance	  of	  several	  component	  processes	  (Roe,	  Busemeyer,	  &	  Townsend,	  2001;	  Trueblood,	  Brown,	  &	  Heathcote,	  2014).	  Two	  such	  mechanisms	  that	  have	  been	  noted	  in	  the	  literature	  as	  important	  predictors	  of	  preferential	  choice	  outcomes	  are	  attentional	  deployment	  and	  information	  accumulation	  threshold.	  Attentional	  deployment	  governs	  which	  features	  receive	  the	  greatest	  attention	  during	  deliberation.	  For	  example,	  an	  individual	  in	  the	  market	  for	  a	  new	  apartment	  may	  care	  more	  about	  the	  size	  of	  their	  future	  apartment	  than	  its	  location,	  and	  would	  therefore	  likely	  pay	  more	  attention	  to	  how	  small	  or	  large	  different	  available	  apartments	  are	  than	  where	  they	  are	  located.	  The	  information	  accumulation	  threshold	  governs	  how	  much	  information	  is	  needed	  before	  a	  selection	  is	  made.	  For	  example,	  an	  individual	  with	  a	  low	  information	  threshold	  would	  be	  willing	  to	  choose	  a	  new	  apartment	  after	  learning	  only	  a	  little	  about	  the	  available	  options,	  while	  another	  individual	  with	  a	  high	  information	  threshold	  would	  only	  be	  willing	  to	  make	  a	  selection	  after	  considering	  the	  available	  information	  about	  each	  apartment	  in	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great	  detail.	  Because	  these	  component	  processes	  influence	  choice	  outcomes,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  investigate	  factors	  that	  influence	  their	  performance.	  One	  factor	  that	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  affect	  preferential	  choice	  is	  an	  individual’s	  emotional	  state	  (see	  Schwarz,	  2000	  and	  So	  et	  al.,	  2015	  for	  reviews).	  Discrete	  emotions	  such	  as	  anger	  and	  fear	  are	  complex	  states	  that	  consist	  of	  several	  key	  dimensions,	  such	  as	  positive-­‐negative	  valence	  and	  situational	  certainty	  (Lerner	  &	  Keltner,	  2000).	  Recent	  literature	  has	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  testing	  discrete	  emotional	  states	  that	  vary	  across	  multiple	  dimensions	  such	  that	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  these	  dimensions	  on	  the	  component	  processes	  of	  decision-­‐making	  might	  be	  uncovered	  (Tiedens	  &	  Linton,	  2001).	  Positive-­‐negative	  valence,	  or	  the	  degree	  to	  which	  an	  emotional	  state	  can	  be	  characterized	  as	  pleasant	  or	  unpleasant,	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  affect	  attentional	  deployment	  (Bower,	  1981;	  Martin,	  Williams,	  &	  Clark,	  1991;	  Strauss	  &	  Allen,	  2006).	  Situational	  certainty,	  or	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  particular	  emotion	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  confidence	  or	  conviction,	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  affect	  the	  information	  accumulation	  threshold	  (Bohner	  &	  Weinerth,	  2001;	  Tiedens	  &	  Linton,	  2001).	  However,	  though	  they	  occur	  concurrently	  in	  various	  emotional	  states,	  the	  effects	  of	  valence	  and	  certainty	  on	  preferential	  choice	  are	  often	  studied	  in	  isolation.	  The	  present	  study	  aims	  to	  further	  research	  on	  emotion	  and	  preferential	  choice	  by	  investigating	  the	  concurrent	  effects	  of	  valence	  and	  certainty	  on	  component	  processes	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  As	  stated,	  both	  preferential	  choice	  and	  emotional	  states	  represent	  complex	  processes	  with	  multiple	  underlying	  mechanisms.	  Mathematical	  modeling	  is	  an	  ideal	  method	  of	  uncovering	  component	  mechanisms	  in	  complex	  processes;	  as	  such,	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modeling	  may	  offer	  a	  more	  powerful	  method	  of	  teasing	  apart	  the	  hypothesized	  effects.	  The	  present	  study	  will	  model	  preferential	  choice	  outcomes	  with	  two	  popular	  models	  to	  determine	  if	  differences	  in	  choice	  outcomes	  across	  discrete	  emotional	  states	  can	  be	  accounted	  for	  by	  changes	  in	  the	  component	  mechanisms	  represented	  in	  the	  model:	  Multialternative	  Decision	  Field	  Theory	  (MDFT;	  Roe	  et	  al.,	  2001)	  and	  the	  Multiattribute	  Linear	  Ballistic	  Accumulator	  (Trueblood	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  Specifically,	  we	  will	  model	  the	  influence	  of	  discrete	  emotional	  states	  on	  the	  similarity	  effect	  (Tversky,	  1972),	  a	  robust	  phenomenon	  in	  preferential	  choice.	  The	  similarity	  effect	  is	  ideal	  for	  investigating	  the	  component	  processes	  of	  decision-­‐making	  because	  it	  is	  a	  robust	  phenomenon	  with	  consistent	  predictions	  about	  choice	  outcomes.	  Furthermore,	  both	  the	  MDFT	  and	  the	  MLBA	  make	  specific	  predictions	  regarding	  the	  effects	  of	  attentional	  deployment	  and	  information	  threshold	  on	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  We	  will	  therefore	  test	  the	  effects	  of	  emotion	  on	  preferential	  choice	  using	  a	  paradigm	  designed	  to	  elicit	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  
1.2	  Models	  of	  Preferential	  Choice	  The	  present	  study	  makes	  predictions	  about	  how	  emotional	  valence	  and	  certainty	  will	  influence	  preferential	  choice	  outcomes	  using	  two	  popular	  models:	  the	  Multialternative	  Decision	  Field	  Theory	  (MDFT;	  Roe	  et	  al.,	  2001)	  and	  the	  Multiattribute	  Linear	  Ballistic	  Accumulator	  (MLBA;	  Trueblood	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  The	  MDFT	  and	  the	  MLBA	  have	  some	  core	  characteristics	  in	  common.	  Both	  models	  predict	  the	  outcome	  in	  preferential	  choice	  scenarios	  consisting	  of	  multiple	  alternatives	  that	  are	  each	  described	  along	  multiple	  attributes,	  or	  features.	  Both	  
	  	   4	  
models	  are	  also	  accumulation	  models,	  meaning	  that	  information	  accumulates	  for	  each	  alternative	  over	  time.	  This	  information	  contributes	  either	  positively	  or	  negatively	  to	  that	  alternative’s	  overall	  perceived	  value,	  or	  preference	  strength.	  The	  first	  alternative	  whose	  preference	  strength	  reaches	  a	  preset	  threshold	  value	  is	  chosen;	  therefore,	  a	  higher	  threshold	  requires	  a	  stronger	  preference	  state	  in	  order	  to	  be	  surpassed.	  Beyond	  these	  commonalities,	  the	  two	  models	  differ	  in	  the	  specific	  process	  by	  which	  information	  about	  each	  alternative	  is	  gathered	  and	  integrated.	  According	  to	  the	  MDFT	  (Figure	  1),	  the	  first	  stage	  of	  preferential	  choice	  involves	  deploying	  attention	  to	  a	  particular	  feature.	  This	  is	  accomplished	  via	  a	  feed-­‐forward	  process	  in	  which	  an	  initial	  matrix	  M,	  consisting	  of	  the	  ratings	  of	  each	  alternative	  across	  each	  feature,	  is	  multiplied	  by	  the	  attention	  vector	  W,	  which	  probabilistically	  activates	  one	  feature	  at	  a	  time	  based	  on	  predetermined	  attention	  weights	  for	  each	  feature.	  If	  the	  weight	  for	  one	  feature	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  weight	  for	  the	  other	  feature,	  then	  the	  former	  feature	  will	  have	  a	  greater	  probability	  of	  becoming	  active	  and,	  therefore,	  have	  a	  greater	  probability	  of	  being	  considered	  at	  any	  particular	  moment.	  The	  activated	  ratings	  are	  then	  compared	  across	  alternatives	  to	  create	  a	  momentary	  impression,	  or	  valence	  V	  of	  each	  alternative	  relative	  to	  the	  others.	  Specifically,	  each	  valence	  is	  the	  product	  of	  the	  activated	  ratings	  and	  a	  contrast	  matrix	  comparing	  the	  rating	  of	  the	  alternative	  i	  to	  the	  average	  rating	  of	  all	  other	  alternatives	  for	  the	  activated	  feature.	  Finally,	  the	  preference	  strength	  P	  of	  each	  alternative	  is	  updated	  through	  integration	  with	  its	  corresponding	  valence	  as	  well	  as	  a	  feedback	  matrix	  S.	  The	  feedback	  matrix	  represents	  a	  competitive	  process	  in	  which	  alternatives	  inhibit	  each	  other	  as	  a	  function	  of	  their	  similarity:	  the	  greater	  the	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similarity	  of	  two	  alternatives’	  ratings	  in	  the	  activated	  feature,	  the	  more	  the	  dominant	  alternative	  will	  inhibit	  the	  weaker	  alternative.	  The	  entire	  process	  described	  above	  repeats	  itself	  until	  the	  preference	  strength	  of	  one	  of	  the	  alternatives	  exceeds	  the	  individual’s	  predetermined	  threshold.	  The	  full	  details	  of	  the	  model	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  	  To	  illustrate,	  consider	  the	  scenario	  of	  choosing	  between	  two	  new	  apartments,	  X	  and	  Y.	  Apartment	  X	  rates	  well	  in	  location	  and	  poorly	  in	  size,	  while	  apartment	  Y	  rates	  poorly	  in	  location	  and	  well	  in	  size	  (see	  points	  X	  and	  Y	  in	  Figure	  2).	  By	  chance,	  it	  happens	  that	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  the	  location	  feature	  during	  first	  consideration,	  meaning	  that	  only	  the	  location	  ratings	  are	  considered.	  The	  location	  ratings	  for	  apartment	  X	  and	  apartment	  Y	  are	  compared,	  and	  the	  first	  impression	  is	  that	  apartment	  X	  is	  the	  better	  choice.	  The	  apartments	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  not	  particularly	  similar	  to	  one	  another	  in	  location	  and	  therefore	  do	  not	  “compete”	  heavily	  with	  each	  other;	  rather,	  X	  is	  the	  clear	  winner	  and	  the	  currently	  preferred	  choice.	  On	  a	  second	  consideration,	  however,	  it	  may	  be	  that	  attention	  is	  given	  to	  the	  size	  feature,	  meaning	  that	  only	  the	  size	  ratings	  are	  considered.	  The	  size	  ratings	  for	  apartment	  X	  and	  apartment	  Y	  are	  compared,	  and	  the	  second	  impression	  is	  that	  apartment	  Y	  is	  the	  better	  choice.	  The	  apartments	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  again	  not	  particularly	  similar	  to	  each	  other	  in	  size,	  and	  Y	  is	  the	  clear	  winner	  without	  additional	  scrutiny.	  The	  two	  apartments	  are	  now	  equally	  preferred.	  Each	  apartment	  continues	  to	  be	  compared	  along	  one	  feature	  at	  a	  time	  until	  one	  apartment’s	  preference	  strength	  exceeds	  the	  individual’s	  personal	  threshold.	  If	  the	  individual	  cares	  more	  about	  location,	  they	  will	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  compare	  apartments	  along	  the	  location	  and	  will	  therefore	  likely	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choose	  apartment	  X.	  If	  they	  care	  more	  about	  size,	  then	  the	  apartments	  will	  likely	  be	  compared	  along	  the	  size	  feature	  more	  often	  and	  apartment	  Y	  will	  be	  the	  more	  likely	  choice.	  	  In	  the	  MLBA	  (Figure	  3),	  the	  initial	  preference	  strengths	  for	  each	  alternative	  are	  randomly	  sampled	  from	  a	  uniform	  distribution	  between	  zero	  and	  an	  upper	  limit	  
A.	  Unlike	  the	  MDFT,	  in	  which	  the	  preference	  strength	  of	  each	  alternative	  can	  increase	  or	  decrease	  at	  each	  step	  in	  time,	  information	  in	  the	  MLBA	  is	  accumulated	  linearly	  such	  that	  the	  preference	  strength	  either	  only	  increases	  or	  only	  decreases	  at	  a	  constant	  rate	  over	  time.	  The	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  preference	  strength	  of	  each	  alternative	  increases	  or	  decreases	  from	  its	  starting	  value	  is	  determined	  by	  each	  alternative’s	  drift	  rate,	  which	  is	  randomly	  sampled	  from	  a	  normal	  distribution	  with	  a	  mean	  of	  d	  and	  a	  standard	  deviation	  of	  s.	  The	  parameter	  d	  is	  calculated	  by	  a	  valuation	  function	  in	  which	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  ratings	  of	  a	  given	  alternative	  and	  the	  ratings	  of	  each	  other	  alternative	  along	  each	  feature	  is	  multiplied	  by	  two	  sets	  of	  attention	  weights:	  feature	  weights	  and	  weights	  for	  positive	  vs.	  negative	  comparisons.	  Feature	  weights	  refer	  to	  the	  amount	  of	  attention	  given	  to	  each	  feature.	  If	  these	  weights	  are	  equal	  for	  each	  feature,	  then	  the	  comparisons	  between	  alternatives	  along	  both	  features	  will	  have	  an	  equal	  impact	  in	  the	  valuation	  function.	  If	  the	  attention	  weight	  for	  one	  feature	  is	  larger	  than	  the	  attention	  weight	  for	  another	  feature,	  then	  comparisons	  between	  alternatives	  in	  the	  former	  feature	  will	  have	  a	  greater	  impact	  than	  comparisons	  in	  the	  latter	  feature.	  Weights	  for	  positive	  vs.	  negative	  comparisons	  have	  similar	  effects:	  if	  positive	  and	  negative	  comparisons	  are	  weighted	  equally,	  then	  the	  “loss”	  that	  an	  alternative	  receives	  when	  compared	  to	  a	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dominant	  alternative	  will	  be	  equal	  in	  absolute	  terms	  to	  the	  “gain”	  that	  the	  dominant	  alternative	  receives.	  The	  value	  of	  d	  for	  each	  alternative	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  that	  alternative’s	  weighted	  differences	  along	  each	  feature,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  positive	  constant	  that	  ensures	  that	  the	  drift	  rate	  will	  be	  positive	  (and	  therefore	  approaching	  the	  decision	  threshold)	  for	  at	  least	  one	  alternative.	  Once	  the	  preference	  strength	  of	  at	  least	  one	  alternative	  exceeds	  the	  threshold	  value,	  that	  alternative	  is	  chosen.	  The	  full	  details	  of	  the	  model	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  To	  illustrate,	  consider	  again	  the	  two	  apartments	  X	  and	  Y.	  By	  chance,	  the	  individual	  may	  start	  out	  with	  a	  small	  preference	  for	  apartment	  X.	  When	  compared,	  each	  apartment	  has	  one	  “gain”	  and	  one	  “loss”:	  apartment	  X	  is	  better	  than	  apartment	  Y	  in	  location,	  but	  apartment	  Y	  is	  better	  than	  apartment	  X	  in	  size.	  Perhaps	  the	  individual	  cares	  more	  about	  size	  than	  location.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  gain	  that	  apartment	  Y	  received	  for	  being	  better	  rated	  in	  size	  will	  matter	  more	  than	  the	  gain	  that	  apartment	  X	  received	  for	  being	  better	  rated	  in	  location;	  similarly,	  the	  loss	  that	  apartment	  X	  received	  for	  being	  poorly	  rated	  in	  size	  will	  matter	  more	  than	  the	  loss	  that	  apartment	  Y	  received	  for	  being	  poorly	  rated	  in	  location.	  The	  impression	  of	  apartment	  Y	  is	  better	  than	  the	  impression	  of	  apartment	  X.	  Perhaps	  the	  individual	  also	  cares	  more	  about	  losses	  than	  gains.	  In	  that	  case,	  the	  overall	  value	  of	  each	  apartment	  would	  depend	  more	  on	  losses	  than	  gains.	  The	  gain	  that	  apartment	  Y	  received	  will	  no	  longer	  outweigh	  the	  gain	  that	  apartment	  X	  received	  as	  much	  as	  it	  initially	  did,	  but	  the	  loss	  that	  apartment	  X	  received	  will	  now	  be	  much	  larger	  proportionally	  than	  the	  loss	  that	  apartment	  Y	  received.	  The	  impression	  of	  apartment	  Y	  is	  still	  better	  than	  the	  impression	  of	  apartment	  X,	  but	  more	  likely	  due	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to	  the	  loss	  that	  apartment	  X	  received.	  The	  longer	  each	  apartment	  is	  considered,	  the	  stronger	  these	  impressions	  get.	  Thus,	  though	  apartment	  X	  started	  out	  as	  the	  preferred	  option	  by	  random	  chance,	  the	  more	  the	  two	  apartments	  are	  considered	  the	  more	  likely	  apartment	  Y	  will	  surpass	  apartment	  X.	  If	  the	  individual’s	  threshold	  is	  low,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  they	  will	  choose	  apartment	  X	  impulsively.	  Otherwise,	  apartment	  Y	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  chosen.	  
1.3	  The	  Similarity	  Effect	  The	  present	  paper	  focuses	  on	  a	  particular	  scenario	  in	  preferential	  choice	  known	  as	  the	  similarity	  effect	  (Tversky,	  1972).	  The	  similarity	  effect	  is	  ideal	  for	  investigating	  the	  component	  processes	  of	  decision-­‐making	  because	  it	  is	  a	  robust	  phenomenon	  with	  consistent	  predictions	  about	  choice	  outcomes.	  Furthermore,	  both	  the	  MDFT	  and	  the	  MLBA	  make	  specific	  predictions	  regarding	  the	  effects	  of	  attentional	  deployment	  and	  information	  threshold	  on	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  To	  illustrate	  the	  similarity	  effect,	  consider	  again	  the	  scenario	  of	  choosing	  between	  apartments.	  Recall	  that	  apartment	  X	  rates	  well	  in	  its	  location	  but	  it	  rates	  poorly	  in	  size.	  In	  contrast,	  apartment	  Y	  rates	  poorly	  in	  its	  location,	  but	  rates	  well	  in	  size	  (see	  points	  X	  and	  Y	  in	  Figure	  2).	  If	  an	  individual	  places	  more	  weight	  on	  location	  than	  size,	  apartment	  X	  will	  be	  likely	  to	  be	  chosen,	  and	  if	  an	  individual	  places	  more	  weight	  on	  size	  than	  location,	  apartment	  Y	  will	  be	  likely	  to	  be	  chosen.	  If	  we	  assume	  that	  the	  two	  features	  are	  weighted	  approximately	  equal	  the	  probabilities	  of	  choosing	  either	  apartment	  will	  also	  be	  approximately	  equal.	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Suppose	  then	  that	  apartment	  Sx	  becomes	  available.	  This	  apartment	  is	  similar	  to	  apartment	  X	  and	  dissimilar	  to	  apartment	  Y.	  Specifically,	  apartment	  Sx	  rates	  slightly	  better	  than	  apartment	  X	  in	  its	  location,	  but	  slightly	  worse	  than	  X	  in	  size	  (see	  points	  X,	  Y,	  and	  Sx	  in	  Figure	  2).	  Now,	  an	  individual	  who	  gave	  greater	  consideration	  to	  size	  would	  still	  choose	  apartment	  Y,	  but	  an	  individual	  who	  gave	  greater	  consideration	  to	  location	  would	  choose	  apartment	  Sx.	  That	  is,	  the	  introduction	  of	  apartment	  Sx	  to	  the	  choice	  scenario	  means	  that	  the	  probabilities	  of	  choosing	  either	  apartment	  X	  or	  apartment	  Y	  are	  no	  longer	  approximately	  equal;	  apartment	  Sx	  lowers	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  apartment	  X	  by	  virtue	  of	  rating	  similarly	  well	  in	  its	  location,	  but	  does	  not	  lower	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  apartment	  Y	  as	  it	  rates	  much	  worse	  in	  size	  and	  is	  therefore	  not	  competitive	  with	  Y	  in	  this	  feature.	  Thus,	  apartment	  Y	  is	  now	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  selected	  than	  apartment	  X.	  This	  phenomenon	  violates	  a	  principle	  of	  preferential	  choice	  known	  as	  independence	  from	  irrelevant	  
alternatives	  (Tversky,	  1972),	  which	  states	  that	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  a	  given	  alternative	  (e.g.,	  X)	  in	  a	  choice	  set	  (e.g.,	  X,	  Y,	  &	  Sx)	  cannot	  be	  larger	  than	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  that	  same	  alternative	  in	  a	  subset	  (e.g.,	  X	  &	  Y).	  	  The	  similarity	  effect	  is	  traditionally	  defined	  as	  a	  reversal	  in	  whether	  X	  or	  Y	  is	  the	  preferred	  option	  based	  on	  the	  choice	  sets	  described	  above,	  for	  instance	  that	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y)	  >	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y)	  but	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  <	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx).	  However,	  previous	  literature	  has	  also	  measured	  the	  similarity	  effect	  as	  a	  comparison	  between	  two	  three-­‐choice	  scenarios:	  one	  in	  which	  S	  is	  similar	  to	  X	  (Sx	  in	  Figure	  2)	  and	  one	  in	  which	  S	  is	  similar	  to	  Y	  (Sy	  in	  Figure	  2)	  (Wedell,	  1991).	  The	  similarity	  effect	  is	  then	  defined	  as	  having	  occurred	  if	  we	  observe	  that	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  <	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  and	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  <	  p(X	  |	  X,	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Y,	  Sy).	  For	  the	  current	  purposes,	  the	  comparison	  between	  two	  ternary	  choice	  scenarios	  is	  to	  be	  preferred	  for	  three	  reasons.	  First,	  it	  does	  not	  require	  the	  assumption	  that	  apartments	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  associated	  with	  particular	  probabilities	  in	  a	  two-­‐choice	  scenario	  (e.g.,	  that	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  approximately	  equal,	  or	  that	  X	  is	  slightly	  preferred	  over	  Y).	  Second,	  it	  allows	  for	  two	  measures	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  because	  the	  choice	  probabilities	  for	  both	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  expected	  to	  shift.	  Third,	  the	  expected	  effect	  size	  of	  the	  change	  in	  choice	  probabilities	  ought	  to	  double	  when	  comparing	  two	  ternary	  choice	  sets	  rather	  than	  one	  binary	  and	  one	  ternary	  choice	  set.	  The	  increased	  effect	  size	  is	  due	  to	  the	  expectation	  that	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  <	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y)	  <	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  and	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  >	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y)	  >	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy).	  Given	  the	  benefits	  of	  the	  three-­‐choice	  comparison	  over	  the	  two-­‐choice	  comparison,	  the	  present	  study	  will	  utilize	  the	  three-­‐choice	  comparison.	  	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  reversal	  in	  choice	  preference	  between	  two	  choice	  sets	  represents	  a	  qualitative	  effect.	  In	  order	  to	  quantify	  the	  effect	  of	  S	  on	  X	  and	  Y	  choice	  probabilities,	  previous	  research	  (Trueblood	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  has	  operationally	  defined	  the	  similarity	  effect	  as	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  <	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  and	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  >	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy).	  The	  changes	  in	  X	  and	  Y	  choice	  probabilities	  are	  shifts	  that	  tend	  to	  occur	  in	  conjunction	  with	  the	  preference	  reversal,	  but	  ultimately	  are	  independent	  of	  it.	  Given	  the	  benefits	  of	  studying	  a	  quantitative	  shift	  rather	  than	  a	  qualitative	  one,	  going	  forward	  we	  will	  adopt	  this	  weaker	  definition	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  According	  to	  the	  MDFT,	  the	  similarity	  effect	  results	  from	  a	  combination	  of	  the	  comparison	  process	  that	  determines	  the	  valence	  of	  each	  option	  and	  the	  competition	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between	  similar	  alternatives	  that	  occurs	  during	  the	  feedback	  process.	  When	  a	  particular	  feature	  is	  being	  considered,	  the	  preference	  strengths	  of	  alternatives	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  each	  other	  on	  that	  feature	  will	  receive	  similar	  benefits	  from	  positive	  comparisons	  when	  they	  rate	  well	  and	  receive	  similar	  losses	  from	  negative	  comparisons	  when	  they	  rate	  poorly.	  Alternatives	  that	  are	  similar	  to	  each	  other	  will	  therefore	  be	  correlated	  with	  one	  another	  during	  the	  comparison	  process.	  Furthermore,	  similar	  alternatives	  will	  compete	  more	  with	  one	  another	  than	  with	  the	  dissimilar	  alternative	  during	  the	  feedback	  process,	  such	  that	  the	  preference	  strength	  of	  the	  dominant	  alternative	  in	  the	  attended	  feature	  will	  benefit	  and	  the	  dominated	  alternative	  will	  receive	  a	  loss.	  As	  a	  result,	  similar	  alternatives	  will	  decrease	  in	  preference	  strength	  as	  they	  compete	  and	  the	  preference	  strength	  of	  the	  dissimilar	  alternative	  will	  be	  allowed	  to	  rise.	  That	  is,	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  <	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  and	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  >	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy).	  	  To	  illustrate	  how	  the	  MDFT	  predicts	  the	  similarity	  effect,	  consider	  again	  the	  three	  apartments	  X,	  Y,	  and	  Sx.	  The	  preference	  strengths	  of	  apartments	  X	  and	  Sx	  will	  both	  benefit	  from	  positive	  contrasts	  when	  the	  location	  feature	  is	  activated	  because	  they	  are	  both	  rated	  better	  than	  the	  average	  location	  rating,	  and	  they	  will	  both	  be	  harmed	  by	  negative	  contrasts	  when	  the	  size	  feature	  is	  activated	  because	  they	  are	  both	  rated	  worse	  than	  the	  average	  size	  rating.	  Apartments	  X	  and	  Sx	  are	  therefore	  perfectly	  correlated	  with	  each	  other	  in	  gains	  and	  losses	  in	  the	  comparison	  process.	  In	  the	  feedback	  process,	  the	  high	  degree	  of	  similarity	  between	  apartments	  X	  and	  Sx	  will	  cause	  them	  to	  strongly	  compete	  with	  one	  another	  but	  not	  with	  apartment	  Y.	  Apartments	  X	  and	  Sx	  will	  alternately	  inhibit	  each	  other	  when	  either	  location	  is	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activated	  (and	  apartment	  Sx	  dominates	  apartment	  X)	  or	  size	  is	  activated	  (and	  apartment	  X	  dominates	  apartment	  Sx).	  However,	  the	  dissimilar	  apartment	  Y	  will	  never	  be	  greatly	  inhibited	  regardless	  of	  which	  feature	  is	  activated	  because	  it	  only	  weakly	  competes	  with	  the	  other	  alternatives	  along	  both	  features.	  Ultimately,	  apartments	  X	  and	  Sx	  are	  equally	  likely	  to	  be	  chosen	  when	  location	  is	  the	  more	  heavily	  weighted	  feature,	  but	  apartment	  Y	  alone	  is	  likely	  to	  be	  chosen	  when	  size	  is	  the	  more	  heavily	  weighted	  feature.	  If	  size	  and	  location	  are	  equally	  weighted,	  apartments	  X	  and	  Sx	  are	  each	  25%	  likely	  to	  be	  chosen	  while	  apartment	  Y	  is	  50%	  likely	  to	  be	  chosen.	  A	  parallel	  pattern	  would	  be	  found	  in	  the	  choice	  set	  including	  apartments	  X,	  Y,	  and	  Sy:	  apartments	  Y	  and	  Sy	  would	  be	  perfectly	  correlated	  with	  each	  other	  in	  gains	  and	  losses	  in	  the	  comparison	  process	  and	  inhibit	  each	  other	  in	  the	  feedback	  process,	  resulting	  in	  a	  25%	  probability	  of	  choosing	  either	  apartment	  Y	  or	  Sy	  and	  a	  50%	  probability	  of	  choosing	  apartment	  X	  if	  size	  and	  location	  are	  equally	  weighted.	  That	  is,	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  <	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  and	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  >	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy).	  According	  to	  the	  MLBA,	  the	  similarity	  effect	  results	  when	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  attentional	  weight	  for	  positive	  differences	  than	  for	  negative	  differences	  in	  comparisons	  between	  alternatives.	  When	  two	  alternatives	  are	  compared	  along	  a	  particular	  feature,	  the	  drift	  rate	  of	  the	  better	  alternative	  will	  increase	  by	  a	  relatively	  large	  amount	  while	  the	  drift	  rate	  of	  the	  worse	  alternative	  will	  only	  moderately	  decrease.	  To	  illustrate,	  consider	  again	  the	  three	  apartments	  X,	  Y,	  and	  Sx.	  When	  comparing	  apartment	  X	  to	  apartment	  Sx,	  apartment	  X	  has	  a	  small	  negative	  difference	  from	  apartment	  Sx	  in	  location	  and	  small	  positive	  difference	  from	  apartment	  Sx	  in	  size.	  In	  the	  same	  comparison,	  apartment	  Sx	  has	  a	  small	  positive	  difference	  from	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apartment	  X	  in	  location	  and	  a	  small	  negative	  difference	  from	  apartment	  X	  in	  size.	  When	  either	  apartment	  is	  compared	  to	  apartment	  Y,	  it	  also	  has	  one	  large	  positive	  difference	  in	  location	  and	  one	  large	  negative	  difference	  in	  size.	  Ultimately,	  apartment	  Y	  has	  a	  total	  of	  two	  large	  positive	  differences	  and	  two	  large	  negative	  differences	  while	  apartments	  X	  and	  Sx	  each	  have	  one	  small	  and	  one	  large	  positive	  difference	  and	  one	  small	  and	  one	  large	  negative	  difference.	  If	  there	  is	  a	  greater	  attentional	  weight	  for	  positive	  differences	  than	  for	  negative	  differences,	  then	  positive	  differences	  will	  have	  a	  greater	  impact	  than	  negative	  differences	  of	  the	  same	  size,	  which	  causes	  the	  drift	  rate	  of	  apartment	  Y	  to	  increase	  more	  than	  the	  drift	  rates	  of	  either	  apartment	  X	  or	  Sx.	  Apartment	  Y	  is	  therefore	  the	  most	  likely	  alternative	  to	  reach	  the	  threshold	  first	  and	  be	  chosen.	  A	  parallel	  pattern	  would	  be	  found	  in	  the	  choice	  set	  including	  apartments	  X,	  Y,	  and	  Sy:	  apartment	  X	  would	  have	  two	  large	  positive	  differences	  and	  two	  large	  negative	  differences	  while	  apartments	  Y	  and	  Sy	  would	  each	  have	  one	  small	  and	  one	  large	  positive	  difference	  and	  one	  small	  and	  one	  large	  negative	  difference.	  The	  drift	  rate	  of	  apartment	  X	  would	  consequently	  receive	  the	  greatest	  increase	  from	  the	  comparison	  process	  and	  be	  the	  most	  likely	  alternative	  to	  be	  chosen.	  That	  is,	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  <	  p(X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  and	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  >	  p(Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy).	  
1.4	  Emotion	  and	  Preferential	  Choice	  Emotion	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  affect	  preferential	  choice	  (Schwarz,	  2000).	  However,	  the	  effects	  of	  emotion	  on	  choice	  outcomes	  are	  often	  unclear	  or	  conflicting.	  One	  potential	  reason	  for	  this	  lack	  of	  clarity	  is	  that	  discrete	  emotions,	  such	  as	  anger	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and	  fear,	  are	  themselves	  complex	  states	  that	  consist	  of	  several	  key	  dimensions,	  such	  as	  positive-­‐negative	  valence	  and	  situational	  certainty	  (Lerner	  &	  Keltner,	  2000).	  Despite	  their	  complex	  nature,	  studies	  of	  emotion	  and	  decision-­‐making	  have	  historically	  defined	  emotion	  as	  a	  one-­‐dimensional	  state,	  commonly	  either	  in	  terms	  of	  physiological	  arousal	  alone	  (e.g.,	  Bechara,	  Damasio,	  Damasio,	  &	  Anderson,	  1994)	  or	  positive-­‐negative	  valence	  alone	  (e.g.,	  Johnson	  &	  Tversky,	  1983).	  Recent	  literature	  has	  highlighted	  the	  importance	  of	  instead	  testing	  emotional	  states	  that	  vary	  across	  multiple	  dimensions,	  such	  that	  the	  differential	  effects	  of	  these	  dimensions	  on	  the	  component	  processes	  of	  decision-­‐making	  might	  be	  uncovered	  (Tiedens	  &	  Linton,	  2001).	  	  The	  emotion	  literature	  identifies	  several	  dimensions	  that	  contribute	  to	  an	  individual’s	  particular	  emotional	  state.	  The	  present	  paper	  focuses	  on	  two	  dimensions	  that	  have	  been	  noted	  as	  having	  a	  particular	  influence	  on	  decision-­‐making:	  positive-­‐negative	  valence	  and	  situational	  certainty.	  Emotional	  valence	  refers	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  an	  emotional	  state	  is	  characterized	  as	  pleasant	  or	  unpleasant.	  Pleasant	  emotional	  states	  include	  happiness,	  excitement,	  and	  surprise,	  while	  unpleasant	  emotional	  states	  include	  anger,	  fear,	  sadness,	  and	  anxiety.	  However,	  emotional	  states	  within	  each	  valence	  category	  may	  be	  further	  distinguished	  along	  other	  dimensions,	  for	  example,	  situational	  certainty.	  Certainty	  refers	  broadly	  to	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  a	  particular	  emotion	  is	  characterized	  by	  a	  sense	  of	  confidence	  or	  conviction	  about	  the	  current	  environment,	  situation,	  or	  focus.	  Uncertain	  emotional	  states	  include	  anxiety,	  fear,	  and	  surprise,	  while	  certain	  emotional	  states	  include	  anger	  and	  happiness.	  When	  emotional	  states	  are	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investigated	  one-­‐dimensionally	  rather	  than	  in	  terms	  of	  discrete	  emotional	  states,	  such	  as	  anger	  and	  fear,	  dimensions	  such	  as	  valence	  and	  certainty	  risk	  being	  confounded	  with	  each	  other.	  The	  present	  study	  aims	  to	  further	  research	  on	  emotion	  and	  preferential	  choice	  by	  investigating	  the	  concurrent	  effects	  of	  valence	  and	  certainty	  on	  decision	  outcomes	  in	  a	  preferential	  choice	  scenario.	  Emotion	  is	  expected	  to	  influence	  behavior	  in	  this	  paradigm	  via	  both	  attentional	  weighting	  and	  threshold,	  which	  will	  subsequently	  influence	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  Previous	  research	  has	  found	  that	  participants	  devote	  greater	  attention	  to	  emotion-­‐congruent	  information	  (Bower,	  1981;	  Martin	  et	  al.,	  1991;	  Strauss	  &	  Allen,	  2006).	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  when	  the	  features	  of	  the	  choice	  alternatives	  are	  framed	  as	  either	  positive	  or	  negative,	  the	  valence	  of	  an	  individual’s	  emotional	  state	  will	  affect	  attentional	  deployment.	  	  Framing	  will	  be	  manipulated	  by	  presenting	  the	  ratings	  of	  each	  of	  the	  three	  alternatives	  in	  the	  choice	  set	  along	  with	  the	  ratings	  for	  a	  fourth	  alternative	  that	  is	  currently	  owned	  by	  the	  individual	  and	  being	  replaced	  by	  one	  of	  the	  three	  new	  alternatives	  and	  can	  not	  itself	  be	  chosen.	  A	  positively	  framed	  feature	  will	  be	  depicted	  such	  that	  all	  choice	  alternatives	  are	  better	  than	  the	  currently	  owned	  selection	  on	  that	  feature,	  while	  a	  negatively	  framed	  feature	  will	  be	  depicted	  such	  that	  all	  choice	  alternatives	  are	  worse	  than	  the	  currently	  owned	  selection	  on	  that	  feature.	  It	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  the	  absolute	  values	  of	  the	  ratings	  for	  the	  three	  new	  apartments	  (i.e.,	  the	  choice	  set)	  will	  not	  change	  between	  framing	  conditions,	  only	  the	  ratings	  of	  the	  current	  apartment.	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Previous	  research	  has	  also	  found	  that	  participants	  in	  an	  emotional	  state	  characterized	  by	  a	  lack	  of	  situational	  certainty,	  such	  as	  fear,	  display	  more	  thorough	  information	  processing	  then	  participants	  in	  an	  emotional	  state	  characterized	  by	  a	  high	  level	  of	  situational	  certainty,	  such	  as	  anger	  (Bohner	  &	  Weinerth,	  2001;	  Tiedens	  &	  Linton,	  2001).	  Consequently,	  it	  is	  expected	  that	  certainty	  will	  affect	  information	  accumulation	  such	  that	  fearful	  individuals	  will	  spend	  more	  time	  considering	  each	  alternative	  (and	  accumulating	  more	  information)	  before	  making	  a	  choice	  than	  angry	  individuals.	  	  
1.5	  Model	  Predictions	  Emotion	  and	  preferential	  choice	  each	  have	  complex	  underlying	  structures.	  Mathematical	  modeling	  offers	  a	  powerful	  method	  of	  teasing	  apart	  the	  hypothesized	  effects	  of	  valence	  and	  certainty	  on	  preferential	  choice.	  To	  begin	  investigating	  the	  potential	  influences	  of	  valence	  and	  certainty	  on	  attentional	  weighting	  and	  threshold,	  and	  subsequently	  on	  the	  similarity	  effect,	  the	  paradigm	  was	  modeled	  using	  the	  MDFT	  and	  the	  MLBA.	  The	  present	  study	  investigates	  three	  main	  hypotheses:	  first,	  that	  the	  valence	  associated	  with	  a	  participant’s	  emotional	  state	  affects	  how	  attention	  is	  differentially	  deployed	  to	  features	  with	  positive	  or	  negative	  framing;	  second,	  that	  the	  certainty	  associated	  with	  a	  participant’s	  emotional	  state	  affects	  how	  systematically	  they	  consider	  the	  features	  of	  each	  of	  the	  alternatives	  in	  the	  choice	  set;	  and	  third,	  that	  the	  concurrent	  effects	  of	  valence	  and	  certainty	  influences	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  The	  third	  hypothesis	  is	  contingent	  upon	  the	  first	  two.	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Since	  valence	  is	  predicted	  to	  affect	  the	  feature	  weights	  and	  certainty	  is	  expected	  to	  affect	  the	  information	  accumulation	  threshold,	  these	  parameters	  were	  each	  varied	  across	  three	  levels	  of	  magnitude	  in	  each	  model:	  low,	  medium,	  and	  high.	  Anger	  (negative	  valence,	  high	  certainty)	  was	  defined	  as	  having	  a	  low	  threshold	  with	  a	  high	  attentional	  weight	  for	  negatively	  framed	  features	  and	  a	  low	  attentional	  weight	  for	  positively	  framed	  features.	  Fear	  (negative	  valence,	  low	  certainty)	  was	  defined	  as	  having	  a	  high	  threshold	  with	  a	  high	  attentional	  weight	  for	  negatively	  framed	  features	  and	  a	  low	  attentional	  weight	  for	  positively	  framed	  features.	  The	  Control	  group	  (moderate	  valence,	  moderate	  certainty)	  was	  defined	  as	  having	  a	  medium	  threshold	  with	  equal	  attentional	  weights	  for	  both	  negatively	  and	  positively	  framed	  features.	  When	  both	  features	  were	  framed	  congruently	  (either	  both	  negative	  or	  both	  positive),	  attentional	  weights	  were	  set	  to	  be	  equal	  in	  all	  conditions.	  	  
1.5.1	  Multialternative	  Decision	  Field	  Theory	  The	  predicted	  effects	  of	  attentional	  weight	  and	  threshold	  on	  the	  similarity	  effect	  in	  the	  MDFT	  are	  summarized	  in	  Figure	  4.	  Specific	  parameter	  values	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  Figure	  4	  presents	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  X	  when	  it	  is	  the	  “similar”	  option	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  minus	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  X	  when	  it	  is	  the	  “different”	  option	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  across	  three	  levels	  of	  attention:	  low	  for	  location	  and	  high	  for	  size,	  equal	  for	  location	  and	  size,	  and	  high	  for	  location	  and	  low	  for	  size.	  These	  probabilities	  are	  estimated	  at	  high,	  medium,	  and	  low	  threshold	  values.	  Note	  that	  the	  similarity	  effect	  has	  occurred	  when	  p(“similar”)-­‐p(“different”)	  is	  negative.	  When	  attention	  is	  equal	  for	  both	  features,	  the	  MDFT	  predicts	  that	  the	  similarity	  effect	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decreases	  as	  threshold	  increases	  as	  a	  result	  of	  increasing	  inhibition	  accumulated	  in	  the	  competitive	  feedback	  process.	  When	  attention	  is	  low	  for	  location	  and	  high	  for	  size,	  threshold	  has	  little	  effect	  because	  X	  is	  poorly	  rated	  in	  size	  and	  therefore	  unlikely	  to	  be	  chosen	  at	  any	  level	  of	  threshold.	  When	  attention	  is	  high	  for	  location	  and	  low	  for	  size,	  threshold	  has	  a	  reverse	  effect	  such	  that	  the	  similarity	  effect	  increases	  as	  threshold	  increases.	  The	  probability	  of	  choosing	  X	  increases	  in	  this	  scenario	  by	  virtue	  of	  a	  greater	  attentional	  weight	  on	  its	  strongest	  feature.	  When	  X	  is	  also	  the	  “different”	  alternative,	  its	  increase	  in	  strength	  after	  each	  iteration	  outweighs	  the	  effects	  of	  inhibition	  that	  occur	  when	  the	  attention	  weights	  are	  equal.	  As	  a	  result,	  the	  similarity	  effect	  increases	  over	  time.	  	  The	  predicted	  choice	  outcomes	  for	  Angry,	  Fearful,	  and	  Control	  participants	  by	  the	  MDFT	  are	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  5.	  Figure	  5	  presents	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  each	  alternative	  in	  the	  Sx	  choice	  set	  minus	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  that	  same	  alternative	  in	  the	  Sy	  choice	  set	  in	  each	  of	  four	  framing	  conditions:	  negative	  location,	  positive	  size;	  positive	  location,	  positive	  size;	  negative	  location,	  negative	  size;	  and	  positive	  location,	  negative	  size.	  The	  probability	  of	  choosing	  X	  should	  be	  greater	  in	  the	  Sx	  choice	  set	  than	  the	  Sy	  choice	  set,	  and	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  Y	  should	  be	  lower	  in	  the	  Sx	  choice	  set	  than	  the	  Sy	  choice	  set.	  Therefore,	  if	  the	  similarity	  effect	  has	  occurred	  we	  will	  see	  negative	  differences	  in	  Figure	  5	  for	  X	  and	  positive	  differences	  in	  Figure	  5	  for	  Y.	  Note	  that	  the	  value	  of	  S	  changes	  between	  choice	  sets	  (from	  Sx	  to	  Sy)	  making	  the	  difference	  in	  choice	  probabilities	  for	  S	  less	  interpretable.	  However,	  they	  are	  still	  provided	  for	  context.	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With	  our	  chosen	  parameter	  values,	  the	  MDFT	  predicts	  that	  when	  the	  features	  are	  framed	  congruently	  (both	  positive	  or	  both	  negative)	  the	  similarity	  effect	  is	  predicted	  to	  be	  largest	  for	  the	  Anger	  condition,	  closely	  followed	  by	  the	  Control	  condition,	  and	  smallest	  for	  the	  Fear	  condition.	  When	  the	  features	  are	  framed	  incongruently	  (positive	  location	  and	  negative	  size	  or	  negative	  location	  and	  positive	  size),	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  will	  choose	  the	  alternative	  that	  has	  the	  highest	  rating	  in	  the	  negatively	  framed	  feature.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  will	  exhibit	  a	  large	  similarity	  effect	  for	  X	  when	  location	  is	  framed	  negatively	  and	  size	  is	  framed	  positively	  and	  Y	  when	  size	  is	  framed	  negatively	  and	  location	  is	  framed	  positively.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  these	  effects	  will	  be	  greatest	  for	  Fear	  due	  to	  the	  predicted	  interaction	  of	  attention	  and	  threshold	  described	  above.	  They	  will	  not	  exhibit	  a	  similarity	  effect	  for	  Y	  when	  location	  is	  framed	  negatively	  and	  size	  is	  framed	  positively	  since	  Y	  is	  rated	  poorly	  in	  location,	  nor	  for	  X	  when	  size	  is	  framed	  negatively	  and	  location	  is	  framed	  positively	  since	  X	  is	  rated	  poorly	  in	  size.	  Participants	  in	  the	  Control	  condition	  will	  exhibit	  a	  standard	  similarity	  effect	  in	  the	  incongruent-­‐framing	  conditions.	  	  Log-­‐transformed	  reaction	  time	  predictions	  for	  the	  MDFT	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  6.	  When	  the	  two	  features	  are	  framed	  congruently,	  participants	  in	  the	  Fear	  condition	  are	  expected	  to	  have	  the	  longest	  reaction	  times	  while	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  condition	  have	  the	  shortest	  reaction	  times.	  Anger	  participants	  are	  still	  predicted	  to	  have	  the	  shortest	  reaction	  times	  when	  the	  two	  features	  are	  framed	  incongruently,	  however	  Fear	  participants	  no	  longer	  consistently	  have	  the	  longest	  reaction	  times	  out	  of	  all	  three	  conditions.	  This	  appears	  to	  be	  due	  to	  a	  main	  effect	  of	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attention	  to	  negatively	  framed	  features.	  For	  both	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  participants,	  reaction	  time	  is	  greater	  for	  the	  Sx	  choice	  set	  in	  the	  negative	  location,	  positive	  size	  framing	  condition	  and	  for	  the	  Sy	  choice	  set	  in	  the	  positive	  location,	  negative	  size	  framing	  condition.	  This	  is	  likely	  an	  effect	  of	  whether	  there	  is	  an	  alternative	  that	  is	  a	  clear	  “winner”	  in	  the	  negatively-­‐framed	  feature	  in	  a	  given	  choice	  set	  –	  that	  is,	  an	  alternative	  that	  has	  the	  best	  ratings	  in	  the	  negatively-­‐framed	  feature	  by	  far.	  For	  example,	  X	  is	  rated	  best	  in	  location	  by	  far	  in	  the	  Sy	  choice	  set.	  If	  attention	  is	  high	  for	  location,	  X	  will	  be	  chosen	  quickly	  from	  that	  set.	  In	  the	  Sx	  choice	  set,	  however,	  both	  X	  and	  Sx	  are	  rated	  fairly	  well,	  and	  if	  attention	  is	  high	  for	  location	  then	  reaction	  time	  will	  increase	  as	  these	  two	  alternatives	  compete	  with	  one	  another.	  Congruently,	  when	  attention	  is	  greatest	  for	  the	  size	  feature,	  Y	  is	  a	  clear	  winner	  in	  the	  Sx	  choice	  set	  and	  will	  be	  chosen	  quickly,	  but	  reaction	  time	  will	  increase	  for	  the	  Sy	  choice	  set	  as	  Sy	  and	  Y	  compete.	  
1.5.2	  Multiattribute	  Linear	  Ballistic	  Accumulator	  The	  predicted	  effects	  of	  attentional	  weight	  and	  threshold	  on	  the	  similarity	  effect	  in	  the	  MLBA	  are	  summarized	  in	  Figure	  7.	  Specific	  parameter	  values	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  As	  with	  Figure	  4,	  Figure	  7	  depicts	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  X	  when	  it	  is	  the	  “similar”	  option	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  minus	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  X	  when	  it	  is	  the	  “different”	  option	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  across	  three	  levels	  of	  attention:	  low	  for	  location	  and	  high	  for	  size,	  equal	  for	  location	  and	  size,	  and	  high	  for	  location	  and	  low	  for	  size,	  and	  these	  probabilities	  are	  estimated	  at	  high,	  medium,	  and	  low	  threshold	  values.	  Note	  again	  that	  the	  similarity	  effect	  has	  occurred	  when	  p(“similar”)-­‐
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p(“different”)	  is	  negative.	  When	  attention	  is	  equal	  for	  both	  features	  the	  MLBA	  makes	  opposite	  threshold	  predictions	  to	  the	  MDFT,	  predicting	  that	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  increases	  as	  threshold	  increases.	  While	  preference	  strengths	  in	  the	  MDFT	  can	  increase	  or	  decrease	  over	  time,	  the	  preference	  strengths	  in	  the	  MLBA	  are	  linear.	  As	  such,	  the	  likelihood	  of	  a	  weak	  “similar”	  option	  (e.g.,	  X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  being	  chosen	  over	  the	  “different”	  option	  by	  chance	  decreases	  over	  time	  as	  the	  preference	  strengths	  of	  the	  alternatives	  grow	  increasingly	  distant	  from	  each	  other.	  However,	  we	  note	  that	  though	  this	  effect	  is	  consistent	  in	  our	  simulations,	  it	  is	  small.	  The	  MLBA	  makes	  similar	  predictions	  to	  the	  MDFT	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  attentional	  weights.	  When	  attention	  is	  low	  for	  location,	  X	  is	  unlikely	  to	  be	  chosen	  at	  any	  threshold;	  as	  such,	  the	  similarity	  effect	  is	  small.	  When	  attention	  is	  high	  for	  location,	  X	  becomes	  more	  likely	  to	  be	  chosen,	  with	  increasing	  probability	  over	  time.	  	  	   The	  predicted	  choice	  outcomes	  for	  Angry,	  Fearful,	  and	  Control	  participants	  by	  the	  MLBA	  are	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  8.	  The	  MLBA	  predicts	  that	  when	  the	  two	  features	  are	  framed	  congruently	  (both	  positive	  or	  both	  negative)	  the	  similarity	  effect	  is	  predicted	  to	  be	  approximately	  the	  same	  for	  the	  three	  emotion	  conditions.	  Similar	  to	  the	  MDFT,	  the	  MLBA	  predicts	  that	  when	  the	  two	  features	  are	  framed	  incongruently,	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  will	  choose	  the	  alternative	  that	  has	  the	  highest	  rating	  in	  the	  negatively	  framed	  feature.	  As	  a	  result,	  they	  will	  exhibit	  a	  large	  similarity	  effect	  for	  X	  when	  location	  is	  framed	  negatively	  and	  size	  is	  framed	  positively	  and	  Y	  when	  size	  is	  framed	  negatively	  and	  location	  is	  framed	  positively.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  these	  effects	  will	  be	  greatest	  for	  Fear	  due	  to	  the	  predicted	  interaction	  of	  attention	  and	  threshold	  described	  above.	  Participants	  in	  the	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Control	  condition	  are	  predicted	  to	  exhibit	  a	  standard	  similarity	  effect	  in	  the	  incongruent-­‐framing	  conditions.	  Log-­‐transformed	  reaction	  time	  predictions	  for	  the	  MLBA	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  9.	  In	  all	  conditions,	  participants	  in	  the	  Fear	  condition	  are	  predicted	  to	  have	  the	  longest	  reaction	  times	  while	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  condition	  are	  predicted	  to	  have	  the	  shortest	  reaction	  times.	  There	  is	  no	  predicted	  variation	  in	  the	  order	  of	  average	  reaction	  time	  across	  the	  three	  conditions	  in	  the	  MLBA	  as	  in	  the	  MDFT.	  Recall	  that	  in	  the	  MDFT,	  attention	  was	  predicted	  to	  affect	  reaction	  time	  in	  the	  incongruent	  framing	  conditions	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  presence	  of	  competition	  between	  alternatives	  that	  both	  rate	  well	  in	  the	  negatively-­‐framed	  feature.	  The	  MLBA	  does	  not	  have	  a	  comparable	  competition	  mechanism,	  and	  thus	  does	  not	  predict	  that	  attention	  will	  affect	  reaction	  time	  in	  this	  manner.	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CHAPTER	  2	  	  
EXPERIMENT	  
2.1	  Introduction	  	   This	  study	  was	  designed	  to	  test	  preferential	  choice	  behavior	  among	  participants	  in	  one	  of	  two	  induced	  emotional	  states,	  Anger	  and	  Fear,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  third	  group	  of	  Control	  participants	  who	  did	  not	  undergo	  an	  emotion	  manipulation.	  Participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  first	  underwent	  an	  emotion	  manipulation	  task	  in	  which	  they	  watched	  a	  video	  designed	  to	  induce	  either	  an	  angry	  or	  fearful	  emotional	  state,	  respectively.	  All	  participants	  then	  completed	  a	  preferential	  choice	  task	  in	  which	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  decide	  which	  among	  a	  set	  of	  three	  apartments	  they	  most	  preferred	  on	  each	  of	  16	  trials	  varied	  across	  four	  feature	  framing	  conditions	  (positive	  size,	  positive	  location;	  positive	  size,	  negative	  location;	  negative	  size,	  positive	  location;	  negative	  size,	  negative	  location),	  two	  average	  rating	  values	  (one	  relatively	  low,	  one	  relatively	  high),	  and	  similarity	  of	  apartment	  S	  (to	  either	  apartment	  X	  or	  apartment	  Y).	  Two	  catch	  trials	  were	  also	  included	  to	  test	  participants’	  engagement	  in	  the	  task.	  All	  participants	  then	  completed	  the	  Differential	  Emotions	  Scale	  (Boyle,	  1984),	  items	  measuring	  arousal	  and	  certainty,	  and	  a	  demographics	  questionnaire.	  Participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  finished	  by	  watching	  a	  video	  intended	  to	  reinstate	  a	  happy	  emotional	  state.	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2.2	  Method	  
2.2.1	  Participants	  A	  total	  of	  744	  participants	  were	  recruited	  to	  complete	  the	  study	  on	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  Turk	  (MTurk;	  Buhrmester,	  Kwang,	  &	  Gosling,	  2011).	  One	  hundred	  thirty-­‐five	  participants	  were	  excluded	  from	  either	  the	  Anger	  or	  Fear	  conditions	  for	  not	  watching	  the	  full	  video	  and	  a	  total	  of	  12	  participants	  from	  all	  three	  conditions	  were	  excluded	  for	  having	  technical	  difficulties	  with	  the	  study,	  leaving	  597	  participants	  in	  the	  analyses	  (193	  Anger,	  185	  Fear,	  219	  Control).	  Participants	  in	  the	  Control	  condition	  earned	  $0.10	  while	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  earned	  $0.20	  (due	  to	  the	  additional	  emotion	  manipulation	  and	  reinstatement).	  
2.2.2	  Materials	  
2.2.2.1	  Emotion	  Manipulation	  Prior	  to	  implementing	  the	  main	  experiment,	  several	  videos	  were	  pretested	  for	  their	  suitability	  as	  stimuli	  in	  an	  emotion	  manipulation	  task.	  Specifically,	  each	  video	  was	  tested	  for	  its	  reliability	  in	  inducing	  a	  target	  emotional	  state	  of	  either	  Anger	  or	  Fear	  as	  well	  as	  inducing	  the	  associated	  target	  component	  states:	  negative	  valence	  and	  low/high	  certainty.	  Viewing	  video	  clips	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  reliably	  produce	  relevant	  emotions	  in	  participants	  (Gross	  &	  Levenson,	  1995;	  Schaefer,	  Nils,	  Sanchez,	  &	  Philippot,	  2010).	  The	  specific	  methodological	  details	  of	  the	  video	  pretesting	  are	  included	  in	  Appendix	  C.	  Across	  measures	  of	  emotional	  state,	  positive	  and	  negative	  valence,	  arousal,	  and	  certainty,	  a	  scene	  from	  Schindler’s	  List	  (a;	  1:55)	  in	  which	  a	  concentration	  camp	  officer	  is	  shown	  shooting	  prisoners	  performed	  best	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among	  the	  Anger	  videos	  while	  a	  scene	  from	  Blair	  Witch	  Project	  (3:57)	  in	  which	  the	  characters	  arrive	  at	  an	  ominous	  cabin	  in	  the	  woods	  performed	  best	  among	  the	  Fear	  videos.	  These	  videos	  were	  therefore	  chosen	  as	  stimuli	  for	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  in	  the	  emotion	  manipulation	  task	  in	  the	  main	  experiment.	  Given	  the	  lack	  of	  consensus	  regarding	  what	  defines	  a	  neutral	  emotional	  state,	  or	  in	  fact	  whether	  a	  neutral	  emotional	  state	  is	  possible,	  no	  video	  manipulation	  was	  used	  for	  the	  Control	  participants.	  	  
2.2.2.2	  Choice	  Stimuli	  	  During	  testing,	  participants	  were	  presented	  with	  18	  trials	  each	  consisting	  of	  a	  choice	  scenario	  for	  which	  all	  alternatives	  and	  all	  features	  were	  presented	  simultaneously.	  The	  choice	  sets	  consisted	  of	  three	  different	  apartments	  that	  have	  been	  rated	  according	  to	  two	  features:	  size	  and	  location.	  The	  feature	  ratings	  were	  depicted	  as	  filled	  bars,	  with	  the	  proportion	  of	  the	  fill	  representative	  of	  the	  size	  of	  the	  rating	  of	  that	  feature	  on	  a	  scale	  from	  “Worst	  for	  Me”	  (unfilled)	  to	  “Best	  for	  Me”	  (completely	  filled).	  On	  each	  trial	  the	  ratings	  for	  apartment	  S	  varied	  such	  that	  they	  were	  similar	  to	  either	  apartment	  X	  (Sx)	  or	  apartment	  Y	  (Sy).	  Importantly,	  though	  each	  apartment	  varied	  in	  terms	  of	  whether	  it	  rated	  better	  on	  size	  or	  location,	  the	  three	  alternatives	  within	  a	  set	  always	  shared	  the	  same	  expected	  value	  when	  the	  ratings	  for	  the	  two	  features	  were	  averaged.	  That	  is,	  there	  was	  never	  a	  best	  option	  in	  a	  given	  trial.	  The	  expected	  value	  of	  the	  apartments	  in	  a	  choice	  set	  was	  varied	  for	  generalizability	  such	  that	  all	  apartments	  had	  an	  average	  rating	  of	  either	  1.5	  or	  2.5	  within	  a	  trial.	  The	  specific	  ratings	  for	  the	  three	  apartments	  in	  the	  EV=2.5	  condition	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are	  outlined	  in	  Figure	  2;	  the	  ratings	  for	  the	  apartments	  in	  the	  EV=1.5	  condition	  are	  the	  same	  as	  the	  EV=2.5	  condition	  minus	  one.	  	  The	  ratings	  of	  a	  fictional	  current	  apartment	  being	  replaced	  by	  one	  of	  the	  new	  alternatives	  were	  also	  presented	  (see	  Figure	  10).	  These	  ratings	  set	  the	  positive	  and	  negative	  framing	  of	  each	  feature.	  As	  previously	  described,	  a	  positively	  framed	  feature	  was	  depicted	  such	  that	  all	  choice	  options	  were	  better	  than	  the	  current	  option	  in	  that	  feature	  while	  a	  negatively	  framed	  feature	  was	  depicted	  such	  that	  all	  choice	  options	  were	  worse	  than	  the	  current	  option	  in	  that	  feature.	  There	  were	  four	  levels	  of	  feature	  framing:	  positive	  size	  and	  negative	  location	  (Figure	  10,	  top	  left	  panel),	  positive	  size	  and	  positive	  location	  (Figure	  10,	  top	  right	  panel),	  negative	  size	  and	  negative	  location	  (Figure	  10,	  bottom	  left	  panel),	  and	  negative	  size	  and	  positive	  location	  (Figure	  10,	  bottom	  right	  panel).	  	  The	  factors	  described	  above	  resulted	  in	  16	  testing	  trials:	  two	  expected	  values	  by	  two	  similarity	  conditions	  by	  four	  feature	  frames.	  In	  addition,	  each	  participant	  was	  shown	  two	  catch	  trials	  in	  which	  one	  apartment	  had	  a	  larger	  expected	  value	  overall	  than	  the	  other	  two;	  that	  is,	  there	  was	  an	  alternative	  that	  was	  a	  clear	  best	  (Figure	  11).	  These	  trials	  were	  included	  to	  identify	  participants	  who	  were	  not	  sufficiently	  engaged	  in	  the	  task.	  	  
2.2.2.3	  Emotion	  Manipulation	  Check	  After	  testing,	  participants	  completed	  the	  Differential	  Emotions	  Scale	  (DES;	  Boyle,	  1984)	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  discrete	  emotional	  state	  and	  positive-­‐negative	  valence.	  In	  the	  interest	  of	  time	  participants	  completed	  only	  a	  subset	  of	  items	  from	  the	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original	  DES	  (see	  Appendix	  D).	  Seven-­‐point	  Likert	  scale	  items	  were	  used	  to	  measure	  situational	  certainty	  (see	  Appendix	  E)	  and	  physiological	  arousal	  (see	  Appendix	  F).	  	  
2.2.3	  Procedure	  Each	  participant	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  was	  recruited	  under	  the	  impression	  that	  they	  would	  participate	  in	  two	  unrelated	  studies:	  one	  on	  decision-­‐making	  and	  another	  in	  which	  they	  would	  rate	  the	  emotionality	  of	  different	  video	  clips.	  The	  video	  task	  was	  completed	  first	  and	  served	  as	  an	  emotion	  manipulation	  for	  the	  subsequent	  preferential	  choice	  task.	  As	  previously	  stated,	  Control	  participants	  did	  not	  complete	  an	  emotion	  manipulation	  and	  instead	  began	  with	  the	  preferential	  choice	  task.	  Participants	  were	  given	  detailed	  instructions	  for	  the	  preferential	  choice	  task	  and	  completed	  three	  practice	  trials	  before	  testing	  (see	  Appendix	  G).	  Each	  response	  involved	  first	  clicking	  the	  button	  on	  the	  screen	  associated	  with	  the	  desired	  alternative	  and	  then	  clicking	  another	  button	  to	  submit	  the	  response.	  It	  was	  therefore	  possible	  for	  participants	  to	  change	  the	  selected	  alternative	  before	  submitting	  a	  final	  response.	  	  Once	  participants	  completed	  the	  preferential	  choice	  task	  they	  were	  asked	  to	  complete	  the	  emotion	  measures	  specified	  above,	  as	  well	  as	  a	  brief	  demographics	  questionnaire	  (see	  Appendix	  H).	  Participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  had	  an	  additional	  positive	  emotion	  reinstatement	  task	  in	  which	  they	  viewed	  a	  physical	  comedy	  scene	  from	  Benny	  and	  Joon	  (2:06).	  
	  	   28	  
2.3	  Results	  
2.3.1	  Subject	  and	  Data	  Removal	  Two	  catch	  trials	  were	  included	  in	  the	  choice	  task	  to	  check	  whether	  participants	  were	  sufficiently	  engaged	  in	  the	  task.	  These	  trials	  included	  a	  clear	  best	  alternative	  that	  had	  a	  higher	  expected	  value	  than	  the	  other	  two	  (see	  Figure	  11).	  A	  total	  of	  70	  participants	  who	  did	  not	  choose	  the	  correct	  alternative	  on	  either	  catch	  trial	  were	  excluded	  from	  the	  study,	  leaving	  527	  participants	  in	  the	  analyses	  (171	  Anger,	  171	  Fear,	  185	  Control).	  Recall	  that	  the	  choice	  sets	  were	  varied	  for	  generalizability	  such	  that	  all	  alternatives	  within	  a	  set	  had	  an	  expected	  value	  of	  either	  1.5	  or	  2.5.	  One	  stimulus	  in	  the	  EV=1.5	  condition	  contained	  a	  design	  error	  that	  made	  this	  condition	  an	  incomplete	  design.	  Therefore	  only	  the	  EV=2.5	  condition	  is	  included	  in	  the	  following	  analyses.	  	  
2.3.2	  Emotion	  Manipulation	  Check	  
The participants’ responses to the DES are displayed in Figure 12. The emotions 
listed in the DES were collapsed into the same aggregate groups using the same 
methodology as described in the pretesting experiment: angry α=0.946; fear α=0.982; 
calm α=0.956. The non-target aggregate groups are detailed in Table 1. 
 The goal of the DES in the main experiment was to verify both that the target 
emotion was stronger than the other emotions (e.g., reported anger was the strongest 
emotion in the Anger condition) and that the target emotion in a given condition was 
stronger than in the other two conditions (e.g., reported anger was stronger in the Anger 
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condition than in the Fear or Control conditions). An ANOVA was performed with 
emotion condition as a between-subject variable and the reported emotion group as a 
within-subject variable. There was a main effect of emotion condition, F(2, 524)=80.72, 
p<0.001 and a main effect of reported emotion group, F(2, 1048)=12.5, p<0.001. 
Importantly, a strong interaction effect of reported emotion group and condition was also 
found, F(4, 1048)=208.4, p<0.001.   
 Planned contrasts indicated that emotions in the anger group were rated highest by 
participants in the Anger condition, t(268.11)=17.78, p<0.001; emotions in the fear group 
were rated highest by participants in the Fear condition, t(337.60)=9.07, p<0.001; and 
emotions in the calm group were rated highest by participants in the Control condition, 
t(322.96)=16.06, p<0.001. Further, emotions in the anger group were rated higher than 
emotions in the fear or calm groups among participants in the Anger condition, 
t(349.34)=10.20, p<0.001; emotions in the fear group were rated higher than emotions in 
the anger or calmness groups among participants in the Fear condition, t(280.53)=12.48, 
p<0.001; and emotions in the calm group were rated higher than emotions in the anger or 
fear groups among participants in the Control condition, t(257.36)=21.10, p<0.001.  The 
emotions were appropriate to the conditions. 
 Ratings of positive and negative valence were measured using the same subscales 
of the DES computed in the video pretesting experiment with the exception of the word 
items that were removed in the present experiment (see Appendix C). The average ratings 
for each subscale in each condition are presented in Figure 13. An ANOVA was 
performed with emotion condition as a between-subject variable and valence subscale as 
a within-subject variable. There was a main effect of emotion condition, F(2, 524)=44.26, 
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p<0.001 and a main effect of valence subscale, F(2, 524)=300.9, p<0.001. An interaction 
effect of valence subscale and condition was also found, F(2, 524)=410.0, p<0.001. 
Planned contrasts indicated that the Anger and Fear conditions each rated the negative 
subscale significantly higher than the positive subscale (tAnger(266.11)=-27.29, p<0.001, 
tFear(263.85)=-16.72, p<0.001), while the Control condition rated the negative subscale 
significantly lower than the positive subscale, t(293.82)=9.77, p<0.001. The Anger and 
Fear conditions were therefore characterized by a negative emotional valence while the 
Control condition was not. 
 Certainty was measured by averaging across the four Likert scale items for each 
participant. The distributions of the average certainty scores are presented in Figure 14. A 
one-way between-subject ANOVA was performed with emotion condition as the 
independent variable. There was a main effect of emotion condition, F(2, 524)=37.27, 
p<0.001. A planned contrast indicated that the Anger condition reported significantly 
higher certainty than the Fear condition, t(338)=-7.12, p<0.001.  
Arousal was measured by averaging across the two Likert scale items for each 
participant. The distributions of the average arousal scores are presented in Figure 15. A 
one-way between-subject ANOVA was performed with emotion condition as the 
independent variable. There was a main effect of emotion condition, F(2, 524)=62.62, 
p<0.001. Planned contrasts indicated that both the Anger and Fear conditions reported 
significantly higher levels of arousal than the Control condition, tAnger(342.96)=-11.29, 
p<0.001 and tFear(330.93)=-7.72, p<0.001.  
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2.3.3	  Preferential	  Choice	  
2.3.3.1	  Behavioral	  Analyses	  There	  are	  three	  main	  hypotheses	  for	  the	  present	  study.	  The	  first	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  participants	  in	  a	  negative	  emotional	  state	  (Anger	  and	  Fear)	  would	  attend	  more	  to	  negatively	  framed	  features	  than	  participants	  who	  were	  not	  in	  a	  negative	  emotional	  state	  (Control).	  Participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  were	  therefore	  expected	  to	  be	  more	  likely	  to	  choose	  alternatives	  that	  were	  rated	  best	  in	  the	  negatively	  framed	  feature	  on	  trials	  in	  which	  the	  two	  features	  were	  framed	  incongruently	  (see	  Figure	  2	  for	  rating	  values).	  Specifically,	  when	  location	  was	  framed	  negatively	  and	  size	  was	  framed	  positively,	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions,	  but	  not	  the	  Control	  condition,	  are	  expected	  to	  prefer	  (S	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  and	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy).	  When	  location	  was	  framed	  positively	  and	  size	  was	  framed	  negatively,	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  are	  expected	  to	  prefer	  (Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  and	  (S	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy).	  The	  first	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  tested	  with	  a	  multinomial	  logistic	  regression.	  The	  first	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  supported	  if	  there	  is	  an	  interaction	  of	  framing	  and	  emotion	  in	  the	  regression.	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  the	  certainty	  associated	  with	  a	  participant’s	  emotional	  state	  would	  affect	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  that	  a	  participant	  spends	  considering	  a	  given	  choice	  set,	  and	  consequently	  how	  systematically	  the	  features	  of	  each	  of	  the	  alternatives	  in	  the	  set	  are	  considered.	  Therefore,	  participants	  in	  an	  emotional	  state	  characterized	  by	  uncertainty,	  such	  as	  fear,	  were	  expected	  to	  consider	  the	  features	  of	  each	  of	  the	  alternatives	  in	  a	  more	  systematic	  fashion	  than	  participants	  in	  an	  emotional	  state	  characterized	  by	  certainty,	  such	  as	  anger.	  The	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second	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  tested	  with	  a	  three-­‐way	  mixed	  ANOVA.	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  will	  be	  supported	  if	  there	  is	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  emotion	  in	  the	  ANOVA.	  Recall	  that	  both	  the	  MDFT	  and	  the	  MLBA	  predicted	  that	  differences	  in	  deliberation	  style	  would	  affect	  choice	  outcomes	  as	  well	  as	  reaction	  times.	  Therefore,	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  will	  also	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  emotion	  condition	  in	  the	  logistic	  regression,	  such	  that	  particular	  emotions	  are	  systematically	  more	  or	  less	  likely	  to	  choose	  the	  preferred	  alternative	  (i.e.,	  the	  most	  likely	  alternative	  in	  a	  given	  choice	  set)	  as	  predicted	  by	  the	  models.	  	  The	  third	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  differences	  in	  attentional	  deployment	  and	  deliberation	  across	  conditions	  would	  in	  turn	  affect	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  When	  the	  features	  were	  congruently	  framed	  such	  that	  they	  were	  either	  both	  positive	  or	  both	  negative,	  the	  standard	  similarity	  effect	  was	  expected	  for	  participants	  in	  all	  conditions,	  which	  would	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  main	  effect	  of	  similarity	  in	  the	  regression.	  For	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions,	  however,	  we	  would	  expect	  a	  different	  pattern	  of	  results	  for	  the	  incongruent	  framing	  conditions.	  Specifically,	  we	  would	  expect	  that	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  <	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  but	  not	  that	  (Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  >	  (Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  when	  location	  was	  framed	  negatively	  and	  size	  was	  framed	  positively,	  and	  (Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  >	  (Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  but	  not	  that	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  <	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  when	  size	  was	  framed	  negatively	  and	  location	  was	  framed	  positively.	  The	  third	  hypothesis	  would	  be	  supported	  by	  a	  three-­‐way	  interaction	  of	  framing,	  emotion,	  and	  similarity	  in	  the	  regression.	  However,	  we	  remind	  the	  reader	  that	  due	  to	  the	  complex	  nature	  of	  the	  predicted	  effects,	  the	  mathematical	  modeling	  presented	  in	  the	  following	  section	  will	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serve	  as	  the	  primary	  test	  of	  this	  hypothesis	  rather	  than	  the	  three-­‐way	  regression	  interaction.	  	  
2.3.3.2.1	  Choice	  Outcomes	  The	  raw	  choice	  outcomes	  are	  displayed	  in	  Figure	  16.	  The	  top	  panel	  represents	  trials	  in	  which	  S	  is	  similar	  to	  X	  and	  the	  bottom	  panel	  represents	  trials	  in	  which	  S	  is	  similar	  to	  Y.	  Differences	  in	  choice	  outcomes	  were	  tested	  with	  a	  multinomial	  logistic	  regression	  with	  emotion	  condition	  (Anger,	  Fear,	  and	  Control),	  framing	  condition	  (positive	  location,	  positive	  size;	  negative	  location,	  positive	  size;	  positive	  location,	  negative	  size;	  and	  negative	  location,	  negative	  size),	  and	  similarity	  of	  S	  (Sx	  and	  Sy)	  as	  factors.	  A	  multinomial	  logistic	  regression	  is	  used	  to	  estimate	  the	  response	  probabilities	  for	  a	  dependent	  variable	  for	  which	  there	  are	  multiple	  nominal	  outcomes,	  as	  predicted	  by	  one	  or	  more	  factors.	  The	  coefficients	  of	  the	  model	  refer	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  probabilities	  associated	  with	  deviations	  from	  a	  baseline.	  For	  the	  present	  test	  the	  baseline	  was	  set	  as	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  S	  when	  a	  participant	  was	  in	  the	  Control	  condition,	  location	  and	  size	  were	  both	  framed	  positively,	  and	  S	  was	  similar	  to	  X.	  The	  baseline	  condition	  is	  represented	  by	  the	  Control	  participants	  in	  the	  upper	  right-­‐hand	  quadrant	  of	  the	  top	  panel	  of	  Figure	  16.	  The	  probability	  of	  choosing	  S	  was	  set	  as	  the	  baseline	  outcome	  because	  only	  changes	  in	  the	  probabilities	  of	  X	  and	  Y	  are	  relevant	  to	  our	  hypotheses.	  The	  Control	  condition	  and	  positive	  feature	  frames	  were	  chosen	  as	  baseline	  factor	  levels	  because	  they	  most	  closely	  approximated	  the	  conditions	  of	  past	  research.	  The	  choice	  to	  use	  the	  Sx	  similarity	  level	  rather	  than	  Sy	  in	  the	  baseline	  model	  was	  arbitrary.	  The	  intercepts	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represent	  the	  change	  in	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  X	  over	  Sx	  or	  Y	  over	  Sx	  for	  the	  same	  baseline	  model.	  All	  other	  coefficients	  refer	  to	  the	  changes	  in	  the	  probabilities	  of	  choosing	  X	  or	  Y	  over	  Sx	  (or	  Sy,	  depending	  on	  the	  similarity	  level)	  as	  each	  level	  of	  each	  factor	  changes.	  For	  example,	  the	  coefficient	  for	  the	  negative	  location,	  positive	  size	  framing	  condition	  (“-­‐L,	  +S”)	  under	  an	  X	  outcome	  would	  refer	  to	  the	  change	  in	  the	  probability	  of	  choosing	  X	  over	  Sx	  in	  that	  framing	  condition	  compared	  to	  when	  both	  features	  are	  framed	  positively.	  The	  full	  set	  of	  β	  estimates,	  odds	  ratios,	  and	  standard	  errors	  for	  each	  deviation	  from	  this	  baseline	  are	  detailed	  in	  Table	  2.	  Given	  the	  large	  number	  of	  coefficients,	  only	  effects	  that	  are	  relevant	  to	  the	  study’s	  hypotheses	  and	  are	  significant	  will	  be	  discussed.	  There	  is	  a	  small	  but	  consistent	  effect	  of	  emotion	  condition	  throughout	  Figure	  16	  in	  which	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  condition	  choose	  the	  preferred	  alternative	  (i.e.,	  the	  alternative	  with	  the	  highest	  choice	  proportion)	  in	  a	  given	  trial	  even	  more	  often	  than	  participants	  in	  the	  other	  two	  conditions.	  This	  effect	  is	  statistically	  significant	  (see	  “Anger”	  in	  Table	  2).	  Though	  there	  is	  not	  a	  similar	  trend	  for	  Fear,	  this	  does	  constitute	  weak	  evidence	  for	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  that	  differences	  in	  deliberation	  between	  emotion	  conditions	  will	  result	  in	  consistent	  differences	  in	  choice	  outcomes	  between	  the	  emotion	  conditions.	  This	  particular	  trend	  most	  closely	  resembles	  the	  threshold	  predictions	  of	  the	  MDFT,	  which	  stated	  that	  the	  lower	  threshold	  values	  hypothesized	  for	  Anger	  participants	  would	  result	  higher	  choice	  proportions	  for	  the	  preferred	  option	  in	  a	  given	  choice	  set.	  	  Comparing	  the	  four	  quadrants	  of	  each	  panel	  in	  Figure	  16,	  it	  is	  apparent	  that	  there	  is	  a	  striking	  main	  effect	  of	  framing	  condition	  on	  choice	  proportions.	  When	  the	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two	  features	  are	  framed	  incongruently,	  as	  in	  the	  upper	  left-­‐hand	  and	  lower	  right-­‐hand	  quadrants	  of	  each	  panel,	  there	  is	  an	  overwhelming	  preference	  for	  a	  particular	  alternative.	  Specifically,	  the	  alternative	  that	  has	  the	  best	  rating	  in	  the	  negatively	  framed	  feature	  is	  consistently	  the	  most	  preferred	  choice	  in	  these	  cases.	  For	  example,	  Y	  is	  chosen	  most	  often	  in	  the	  lower	  right-­‐hand	  quadrant	  of	  the	  top	  panel	  of	  Figure	  16	  because	  Y	  has	  the	  highest	  size	  rating	  in	  the	  Sx	  choice	  set	  and	  size	  is	  framed	  negatively	  in	  that	  quadrant.	  Each	  of	  the	  incongruent	  framing	  conditions	  has	  a	  significant	  effect	  on	  choice	  proportions	  (see	  “-­‐L,	  +S”	  and	  “+L,	  -­‐S”	  in	  Table	  2).	  The	  first	  hypothesis	  predicted	  that	  this	  effect	  would	  be	  more	  extreme	  for	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  than	  the	  Control	  conditions.	  Though	  we	  see	  a	  trend	  in	  this	  direction	  for	  Anger	  (see	  the	  upper	  left-­‐hand	  and	  lower	  right-­‐hand	  quadrants	  of	  Figure	  16),	  there	  are	  no	  significant	  interactions	  of	  these	  framing	  conditions	  and	  any	  of	  the	  emotion	  conditions	  (see	  “Anger:	  -­‐L,	  +S”,	  “Anger:	  +L,	  -­‐S”,	  “Fear:	  -­‐L,	  +S”,	  and	  “Fear:	  +L,	  -­‐S”	  in	  Table	  2).	  The	  final	  framing	  condition,	  in	  which	  both	  features	  are	  framed	  negatively,	  is	  depicted	  in	  the	  lower	  left-­‐hand	  quadrants	  of	  each	  panel	  of	  Figure	  16.	  There	  is	  a	  surprising	  effect	  of	  this	  framing	  condition	  in	  which	  rather	  than	  preferring	  the	  dissimilar	  alternative,	  as	  we	  would	  expect,	  participants	  are	  now	  most	  likely	  to	  choose	  the	  “similar”	  alternative.	  That	  is,	  participants	  prefer	  the	  alternative	  out	  of	  X	  and	  Y	  that	  is	  most	  similar	  to	  S.	  This	  is	  a	  very	  intriguing	  finding	  that	  violates	  the	  premises	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect,	  and	  to	  our	  knowledge	  this	  is	  the	  first	  time	  it	  has	  been	  observed	  in	  the	  literature.	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To	  speculate	  about	  why	  this	  effect	  might	  have	  occurred,	  refer	  to	  the	  lower	  left-­‐hand	  panel	  of	  Figure	  10.	  In	  this	  framing	  condition	  all	  three	  alternatives	  rate	  worse	  than	  the	  current	  apartment	  in	  both	  size	  and	  location.	  It	  may	  therefore	  help	  to	  characterize	  the	  similar	  alternative	  (apartment	  1	  in	  Figure	  10)	  as	  the	  “middling”	  option	  that	  never	  has	  the	  best	  or	  worst	  rating	  in	  either	  size	  (such	  as	  apartment	  3)	  or	  location	  (such	  as	  apartment	  2).	  As	  a	  result,	  this	  alternative	  also	  never	  has	  the	  greatest	  loss	  in	  either	  feature	  when	  compared	  to	  the	  participant’s	  hypothetical	  current	  apartment.	  It	  is	  possible	  then	  that	  participants	  prefer	  the	  similar	  alternative	  because	  they	  would	  rather	  take	  a	  moderate	  loss	  in	  both	  size	  and	  location	  than	  the	  largest	  possible	  loss	  in	  either	  feature.	  Though	  this	  trend	  is	  consistent	  for	  all	  emotion	  conditions,	  it	  is	  only	  significant	  for	  the	  Anger	  condition	  (see	  “Anger:	  -­‐L,	  -­‐S”	  in	  Table	  2).	  	   It	  is	  easier	  to	  discuss	  the	  extent	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  in	  the	  data	  and	  its	  potential	  interactions	  with	  emotion	  and	  framing	  by	  referring	  to	  Figure	  17,	  which	  summarizes	  the	  data	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  difference	  in	  choice	  proportions	  between	  the	  X,	  Y,	  Sx	  choice	  set	  and	  the	  X,	  Y,	  Sy	  choice	  set.	  Given	  that	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  <	  (X	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  and	  (Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  >	  (Y	  |	  X,	  Y,	  Sy),	  the	  bars	  in	  Figure	  17	  should	  be	  negative	  for	  X	  and	  positive	  for	  Y	  if	  the	  similarity	  effect	  has	  occurred.	  Refer	  to	  the	  upper	  right-­‐hand	  quadrant	  of	  Figure	  17,	  in	  which	  both	  size	  and	  location	  are	  framed	  positively.	  Though	  it	  is	  not	  significant	  (see	  “Sy”	  in	  Table	  2),	  we	  do	  see	  the	  correct	  trend	  for	  the	  similarity	  effect	  in	  the	  data:	  The	  relative	  probability	  of	  choosing	  X	  decreases	  between	  the	  Sx	  and	  Sy	  choice	  sets,	  while	  the	  relative	  probability	  of	  choosing	  Y	  increases.	  The	  magnitude	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  changes	  dramatically	  based	  on	  framing	  condition,	  as	  we	  would	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expect	  based	  on	  the	  effects	  of	  framing	  outlined	  previously	  (see	  “-­‐L,	  +S:	  Sy”	  and	  “+L,	  -­‐S:	  Sy”	  in	  Table	  2).	  We	  also	  see	  a	  consistent	  effect	  of	  emotion	  condition	  on	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  across	  framing	  conditions,	  such	  that	  the	  Anger	  condition	  tends	  to	  have	  the	  largest	  similarity	  effect.	  In	  the	  incongruent	  framing	  conditions	  Fear	  also	  appears	  to	  have	  a	  consistently	  larger	  similarity	  effect	  than	  Control,	  though	  not	  as	  large	  as	  Anger.	  There	  are	  no	  significant	  three-­‐way	  interactions	  between	  emotion,	  framing,	  and	  similarity	  of	  S	  in	  the	  regression	  model,	  and	  we	  therefore	  do	  not	  find	  evidence	  for	  the	  third	  hypothesis	  in	  the	  regression.	  Given	  the	  complexity	  of	  such	  an	  effect,	  however,	  the	  potential	  interactions	  of	  emotion	  and	  framing	  with	  the	  similarity	  effect	  will	  be	  primarily	  discussed	  in	  the	  modeling	  section	  below.	  
2.3.3.2.2	  Reaction	  Time	  Differences	  in	  reaction	  times	  were	  analyzed	  with	  a	  three-­‐way	  ANOVA.	  Recall	  that	  the	  experiment	  included	  one	  trial	  per	  page	  on	  Qualtrics,	  meaning	  that	  participants	  would	  first	  select	  an	  apartment	  then	  click	  “Next”	  to	  finalize	  their	  answer	  and	  move	  on	  to	  the	  next	  page.	  Emotion	  condition,	  framing	  condition,	  and	  similarity	  of	  S	  served	  as	  factors	  in	  each	  model,	  with	  reaction	  time	  for	  page	  submission	  as	  the	  dependent	  variable.	  The	  reaction	  time	  scores	  were	  log	  transformed	  for	  the	  analyses.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  ANOVA	  are	  summarized	  in	  Table	  3.	  The	  means	  and	  standard	  errors	  are	  depicted	  in	  Figure	  18.	  There	  was	  no	  effect	  of	  emotion	  condition	  on	  page	  submission	  RT,	  F(2,	  511)=0.46,	  p=0.634.	  The	  reaction	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time	  data	  therefore	  do	  not	  support	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  that	  there	  are	  differences	  in	  deliberation	  between	  emotion	  conditions.	  	  There	  was	  an	  effect	  of	  framing	  condition	  on	  page	  submission	  RT,	  F(3,	  1533)=9.15,	  p<0.001,	  such	  that	  the	  negative	  location,	  negative	  size	  condition	  had	  the	  longest	  reaction	  times	  whereas	  the	  negative	  location,	  positive	  size	  condition	  had	  the	  shortest	  reaction	  times	  (see	  Figure	  18).	  A	  post-­‐hoc	  contrast	  revealed	  that	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  negative	  location,	  negative	  size	  condition	  and	  the	  adjacent	  condition	  of	  positive	  location,	  negative	  size	  was	  significant	  using	  a	  Bonferroni-­‐correct	  alpha	  value	  of	  0.017,	  t(2053.96)=2.50,	  p=0.012.	  No	  other	  pairs	  were	  significantly	  different.	  	  Though	  it	  is	  perhaps	  less	  theoretically	  interesting,	  it	  is	  important	  to	  note	  that	  there	  was	  a	  significant	  main	  effect	  of	  similarity	  of	  S	  on	  page	  submission	  RT,	  F(1,	  511)=29.11,	  p<0.001,	  such	  that	  RT	  was	  greater	  when	  S	  was	  similar	  to	  X.	  This	  effects	  may	  be	  due	  to	  the	  fact	  that	  the	  order	  in	  which	  the	  alternatives	  were	  presented	  did	  not	  vary	  across	  trials,	  and	  comparing	  the	  small	  difference	  between	  X	  and	  Sx	  may	  have	  been	  more	  difficult	  than	  comparing	  the	  small	  difference	  between	  Y	  and	  Sy	  since	  X	  and	  S	  were	  always	  the	  furthest	  apart	  on	  screen	  (see	  Figure	  10).	  There	  was	  also	  an	  interactive	  effect	  of	  similarity	  of	  S	  and	  framing	  condition,	  F(3,	  1533)=2.68,	  p=0.046.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  order	  effects	  may	  also	  explain	  this	  interaction;	  that	  is,	  the	  distance	  between	  Y	  and	  the	  current	  apartment’s	  ratings	  may	  compensate	  for	  the	  advantage	  that	  Y	  has	  in	  reaction	  time	  due	  to	  its	  proximity	  to	  S	  when	  the	  framing	  condition	  is	  more	  complex	  (i.e.,	  when	  the	  features	  are	  framed	  incongruently).	  Indeed,	  we	  see	  a	  difference	  in	  reaction	  times	  between	  similarity	  sets	  in	  the	  congruent	  framing	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conditions,	  but	  not	  the	  incongruent	  framing	  conditions	  (see	  Figure	  18).	  In	  future	  experiments	  we	  will	  be	  cautious	  to	  randomize	  the	  order	  in	  which	  the	  alternatives	  are	  presented.	  
2.3.3.3	  Mathematical	  Modeling	  The	  aim	  of	  the	  present	  study	  is	  to	  investigate	  the	  effects	  of	  discrete	  emotional	  states	  on	  preferential	  choice.	  Specifically,	  our	  goal	  was	  to	  determine	  whether	  particular	  emotional	  dimensions,	  valence	  and	  certainty,	  affected	  particular	  component	  processes	  underlying	  preferential	  choice,	  attentional	  deployment	  and	  accumulation	  threshold.	  Mathematical	  modeling	  offers	  a	  powerful	  method	  of	  uncovering	  hidden	  component	  processes,	  and	  is	  therefore	  an	  ideal	  tool	  for	  testing	  differences	  in	  component	  processes	  between	  different	  induced	  emotional	  states.	  Recall	  that	  the	  present	  experiment	  was	  initially	  simulated	  in	  two	  popular	  models	  of	  preferential	  choice:	  the	  Multialternative	  Decision	  Field	  Theory	  (MDFT)	  and	  the	  Multiattribute	  Linear	  Ballistic	  Accumulator	  (MLBA).	  The	  choice	  outcomes	  predicted	  by	  the	  MDFT	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  5,	  and	  the	  choice	  proportions	  for	  the	  MLBA	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  8.	  Figure	  17	  displays	  the	  choice	  outcomes	  that	  were	  observed	  in	  the	  actual	  experiment.	  Each	  figure	  summarized	  the	  choice	  proportions	  for	  each	  alternative	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect,	  defined	  as	  the	  choice	  proportions	  in	  the	  (X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  choice	  set	  subtracted	  from	  the	  choice	  proportions	  in	  the	  (X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  choice	  set.	  	   Both	  the	  MDFT	  and	  the	  MLBA	  made	  generally	  good	  predictions	  of	  the	  data.	  Both	  models	  correctly	  predicted	  that	  the	  similarity	  effect	  would	  occur	  when	  both	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features	  were	  framed	  positively,	  as	  well	  which	  alternative	  would	  be	  most	  preferred	  in	  each	  of	  the	  incongruent	  framing	  conditions.	  However,	  the	  simulations	  that	  we	  conducted	  with	  theoretically	  motivated	  parameter	  values	  did	  not	  predict	  several	  of	  the	  observed	  effects.	  Neither	  model	  predicted	  that	  the	  Anger	  condition	  would	  exhibit	  the	  largest	  similarity	  effect	  in	  all	  framing	  conditions.	  Additionally,	  neither	  model	  predicted	  that	  the	  Control	  condition	  would	  also	  exhibit	  incongruent	  framing	  effects.	  We	  note	  that	  predictions	  regarding	  the	  Control	  condition	  should	  be	  taken	  with	  a	  grain	  of	  salt	  given	  the	  strong	  assumptions	  that	  we	  made	  regarding	  the	  complete	  neutrality	  of	  these	  participants.	  The	  most	  interesting	  discrepancy	  between	  the	  simulations	  and	  the	  observed	  data	  is	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  when	  both	  features	  were	  framed	  negatively.	  While	  the	  incorrect	  predictions	  for	  both	  the	  Anger	  and	  Control	  conditions	  may	  be	  a	  consequence	  of	  the	  parameter	  values	  we	  selected,	  the	  surprising	  effects	  of	  the	  negative	  location,	  negative	  size	  framing	  condition	  warrants	  deeper	  probing	  of	  the	  models	  themselves.	  	  
2.3.3.3.1	  Four-­‐Choice	  Simulations	  One	  possible	  explanation	  of	  the	  reversed	  similarity	  effect	  in	  this	  framing	  condition	  is	  that	  the	  inclusion	  of	  ratings	  for	  an	  additional	  apartment	  that	  cannot	  be	  chosen,	  a	  novel	  modification	  to	  the	  similarity	  effect	  paradigm,	  may	  influence	  behavior	  on	  a	  deeper	  level	  than	  attentional	  deployment.	  Specifically,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  participants	  are	  still	  including	  the	  current	  apartment	  in	  the	  deliberation	  process	  even	  though	  they	  know	  that	  it	  is	  not	  a	  viable	  option.	  To	  investigate	  this	  theory,	  we	  simulated	  the	  choice	  task	  in	  each	  model	  with	  four	  alternatives	  instead	  of	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three	  while	  still	  preventing	  the	  model	  from	  selecting	  the	  fourth	  alternative.	  That	  is,	  ratings	  for	  apartments	  X,	  Y,	  S,	  and	  the	  current	  apartment	  C	  were	  entered	  into	  each	  model,	  but	  the	  decision	  process	  continued	  until	  either	  X,	  Y,	  or	  S	  (and	  not	  C)	  exceeded	  the	  decision	  threshold.	  See	  Figure	  2	  for	  relative	  rating	  values.	  	  The	  predictions	  made	  by	  the	  MDFT	  in	  the	  four-­‐choice	  scenario	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  19.	  Specific	  parameter	  values	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  A.	  Compared	  to	  the	  original	  three-­‐choice	  MDFT	  predictions	  (Figure	  5),	  it	  is	  still	  the	  case	  that	  when	  size	  and	  location	  are	  both	  framed	  positively	  participants	  in	  all	  conditions	  are	  predicted	  to	  exhibit	  a	  traditional	  similarity	  effect.	  It	  is	  also	  still	  the	  case	  that	  when	  size	  and	  location	  are	  framed	  incongruently	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  are	  predicted	  to	  select	  the	  alternative	  that	  is	  rated	  best	  in	  the	  negatively	  framed	  feature,	  resulting	  in	  an	  increased	  similarity	  effect	  for	  X	  when	  location	  is	  framed	  negatively	  and	  size	  is	  framed	  positively	  and	  for	  Y	  when	  size	  is	  framed	  negatively	  and	  location	  is	  framed	  positively.	  This	  effect	  is	  still	  not	  predicted	  for	  participants	  in	  the	  Control	  condition,	  and	  participants	  in	  the	  Fear	  condition	  are	  still	  expected	  to	  have	  the	  most	  extreme	  effect.	  Critically,	  however,	  the	  model	  now	  predicts	  that	  the	  similar	  alternative	  (X	  in	  the	  Sx	  choice	  set	  and	  Y	  in	  the	  Sy	  choice	  set)	  is	  most	  likely	  to	  be	  chosen	  when	  both	  features	  are	  framed	  negatively,	  resulting	  in	  a	  reversal	  of	  the	  traditional	  similarity	  effect.	  This	  reversal	  occurs	  as	  a	  result	  of	  the	  current	  apartment	  heavily	  dominating	  the	  three	  new	  apartments	  in	  the	  comparison	  process.	  Though	  each	  alternative	  now	  has	  an	  additional	  negative	  comparison	  in	  each	  feature,	  the	  preference	  strength	  of	  the	  similar	  alternative	  is	  harmed	  the	  least	  since	  C	  competes	  most	  with	  S	  along	  one	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feature	  and	  the	  dissimilar	  alternative	  along	  the	  other.	  This	  allows	  the	  similar	  alternative	  to	  become	  the	  most	  likely	  choice	  because	  it	  does	  not	  suffer	  additional	  inhibition	  by	  C,	  and	  its	  preference	  strength	  is	  therefore	  still	  allowed	  to	  grow	  over	  time.	  However,	  neither	  the	  reversed	  similarity	  effect	  nor	  the	  standard	  similarity	  effect	  is	  predicted	  for	  Anger.	  This	  is	  likely	  because	  the	  low	  threshold	  for	  Anger	  only	  allows	  for	  the	  standard	  similarity	  effect	  to	  be	  diminished,	  not	  reversed.	  Predicted	  reaction	  times	  by	  the	  four-­‐choice	  MDFT	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  20,	  and	  mirror	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  original	  three-­‐choice	  MDFT	  with	  the	  exception	  that	  reaction	  times	  are	  now	  expected	  to	  be	  longest	  when	  both	  features	  are	  framed	  negatively,	  as	  observed	  in	  the	  data.	  	   The	  predictions	  made	  by	  the	  MLBA	  in	  the	  four-­‐choice	  scenario	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  21.	  Specific	  parameter	  values	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  There	  are	  no	  meaningful	  differences	  between	  the	  three-­‐	  and	  four-­‐choice	  versions	  of	  the	  MLBA.	  Compared	  to	  the	  original	  three-­‐choice	  MLBA	  predictions	  (see	  Figure	  8),	  it	  is	  again	  the	  case	  that	  a	  standard	  similarity	  effect	  is	  predicted	  for	  all	  conditions	  when	  both	  features	  are	  framed	  positively.	  It	  is	  also	  still	  the	  case	  that	  when	  size	  and	  location	  are	  framed	  incongruently	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  are	  predicted	  to	  select	  the	  alternative	  that	  is	  rated	  best	  in	  the	  negatively	  framed	  feature,	  resulting	  in	  an	  increased	  similarity	  effect	  for	  X	  when	  location	  is	  framed	  negatively	  and	  size	  is	  framed	  positively	  and	  for	  Y	  when	  size	  is	  framed	  negatively	  and	  location	  is	  framed	  positively.	  This	  effect	  is	  still	  not	  predicted	  for	  participants	  in	  the	  Control	  condition,	  and	  participants	  in	  the	  Fear	  condition	  are	  still	  expected	  to	  have	  the	  most	  extreme	  effect.	  Unlike	  the	  four-­‐choice	  MDFT,	  the	  four-­‐choice	  MLBA	  does	  not	  predict	  a	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reversal	  in	  the	  similarity	  effect	  when	  both	  features	  are	  framed	  negatively.	  Predicted	  reaction	  times	  by	  the	  four-­‐choice	  MLBA	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  22,	  and	  mirror	  the	  predictions	  of	  the	  original	  three-­‐choice	  MLBA.	  	  To	  summarize,	  the	  modified	  four-­‐choice	  version	  of	  the	  MDFT	  performs	  better	  than	  the	  standard	  three-­‐choice	  version	  while	  both	  versions	  of	  the	  MLBA	  perform	  similarly.	  Neither	  of	  the	  models	  captures	  the	  effects	  of	  Anger	  across	  framing	  conditions.	  Of	  particular	  importance,	  the	  four-­‐choice	  MDFT	  predicts	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  when	  both	  features	  are	  framed	  negatively,	  but	  not	  the	  MLBA.	  The	  four-­‐choice	  MDFT	  thus	  appears	  to	  best	  predict	  the	  choice	  proportions	  found	  in	  the	  actual	  data	  based	  on	  simulations	  alone.	  These	  predictions	  are	  however	  based	  on	  the	  theoretically	  motivated	  parameter	  values	  that	  we	  selected.	  It	  is	  possible	  that	  the	  MLBA	  may	  be	  able	  to	  account	  for	  this	  pattern	  of	  results	  using	  a	  different	  set	  of	  parameters.	  Though	  we	  are	  only	  able	  to	  rely	  on	  simulations	  of	  the	  MDFT,	  the	  MLBA	  can	  be	  fit	  to	  subject	  data	  to	  estimate	  parameter	  values.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  MLBA	  model	  fitting	  are	  described	  below.	  	  
2.3.3.3.2	  MLBA	  Fitting	  	  We	  utilized	  the	  four-­‐choice	  version	  of	  the	  MLBA	  in	  our	  fitting	  procedures	  due	  to	  the	  general	  advantages	  of	  the	  four-­‐choice	  scenario	  in	  simulations	  over	  the	  three-­‐choice	  scenario.	  Because	  of	  our	  low	  within-­‐subject	  sample	  size,	  the	  model	  was	  fit	  to	  data	  aggregated	  within	  emotion	  condition	  rather	  than	  to	  individuals;	  therefore	  only	  one	  set	  of	  parameter	  values	  is	  provided	  for	  each	  emotion	  condition.	  The	  best-­‐fitting	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parameter	  values	  for	  each	  condition	  are	  presented	  in	  Table	  4.	  In	  addition	  to	  threshold	  and	  the	  parameter	  governing	  attention	  to	  negative	  framing	  (βnegative),	  the	  positive	  constant	  (I0)	  as	  well	  as	  the	  parameters	  governing	  attention	  to	  positive	  differences	  (λp),	  negative	  differences	  (λn),	  and	  attention	  to	  size	  compared	  to	  location	  (βsize)	  were	  allowed	  to	  vary	  due	  to	  their	  relevance	  to	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  The	  full	  details	  of	  the	  fitting	  procedure	  are	  described	  in	  Appendix	  B.	  The	  first	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  participants	  in	  a	  negative	  emotional	  state	  (Anger	  and	  Fear)	  would	  attend	  more	  to	  negatively	  framed	  features	  than	  participants	  who	  are	  not	  in	  a	  negative	  emotional	  state	  (Control).	  Participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  were	  therefore	  expected	  to	  exhibit	  an	  increase	  in	  attention	  to	  negatively	  framed	  features.	  The	  recovered	  parameter	  values	  do	  not	  support	  the	  first	  hypothesis,	  as	  attention	  to	  negatively-­‐framed	  features	  was	  estimated	  to	  be	  high	  for	  all	  conditions	  (see	  “βnegative”	  in	  Table	  4).	  Anger	  was	  estimated	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  value	  (3.57),	  followed	  by	  Control	  (3.31)	  and	  Fear	  (3.25).	  This	  result	  suggests	  that	  attention	  is	  high	  for	  negatively	  framed	  features	  relative	  to	  positively	  framed	  features	  for	  all	  participants,	  regardless	  of	  emotion	  condition.	  	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  the	  certainty	  associated	  with	  a	  participant’s	  emotional	  state	  would	  affect	  the	  amount	  of	  time	  that	  a	  participant	  spends	  considering	  a	  given	  choice	  set,	  and	  consequently	  how	  systematically	  the	  features	  of	  each	  of	  the	  alternatives	  in	  the	  set	  are	  considered.	  Therefore,	  participants	  in	  an	  emotional	  state	  characterized	  by	  uncertainty,	  such	  as	  fear,	  were	  expected	  to	  consider	  the	  features	  of	  each	  of	  the	  alternatives	  in	  a	  more	  systematic	  fashion	  than	  participants	  in	  an	  emotional	  state	  characterized	  by	  certainty,	  such	  as	  anger.	  The	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recovered	  differences	  in	  threshold	  do	  not	  support	  the	  second	  hypotheses	  (see	  “Threshold”	  in	  Table	  4);	  instead,	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  condition	  were	  estimated	  to	  have	  the	  highest	  threshold	  (18.08),	  followed	  closely	  by	  participants	  in	  the	  Fear	  condition	  (16.47).	  Participants	  in	  the	  Control	  condition	  were	  estimated	  to	  have	  the	  lowest	  threshold	  by	  far	  (10.41).	  The	  difference	  in	  threshold	  between	  the	  Control	  condition	  and	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  suggests	  that	  negative	  valence	  may	  be	  associated	  with	  threshold	  rather	  than	  uncertainty.	  	  The	  third	  hypothesis	  states	  that	  differences	  in	  attentional	  deployment	  and	  deliberation	  across	  conditions	  would	  in	  turn	  affect	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  Simulated	  choice	  data	  and	  log-­‐transformed	  reactions	  times	  based	  on	  the	  best-­‐fitting	  parameters	  are	  presented	  in	  Figures	  23	  and	  24,	  respectively.	  Figure	  23	  summarizes	  the	  choice	  proportions	  in	  terms	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  Compare	  this	  figure	  to	  the	  subject	  data	  presented	  in	  Figure	  17.	  The	  simulated	  data	  capture	  the	  preference	  for	  the	  alternative	  that	  performs	  best	  in	  the	  negatively-­‐framed	  feature	  for	  all	  emotion	  conditions	  in	  incongruently-­‐framed	  trials.	  Importantly	  however,	  the	  MLBA	  was	  still	  not	  able	  to	  reproduce	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  for	  trials	  in	  which	  both	  features	  were	  framed	  negatively.	  Next	  compare	  the	  simulated	  reaction	  time	  data	  based	  on	  the	  best-­‐fitting	  parameters	  (Figure	  24)	  to	  the	  subjects’	  reaction	  times	  (Figure	  18).	  The	  simulated	  reaction	  time	  data	  estimates	  Control	  as	  having	  particularly	  long	  reaction	  times	  that	  do	  not	  reflect	  the	  performance	  of	  Control	  participants	  in	  the	  subject	  data.	  It	  therefore	  does	  not	  appear	  that	  the	  recovered	  parameters	  do	  a	  good	  job	  of	  predicting	  the	  observed	  choice	  outcomes.	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CHAPTER	  3	  	  
DISCUSSION	  Past	  research	  has	  shown	  that	  emotion	  affects	  preferential	  choice	  outcomes	  (see	  Schwarz,	  2000	  and	  So	  et	  al.,	  2015	  for	  reviews).	  Though	  emotion	  is	  often	  defined	  one-­‐dimensionally	  in	  the	  decision-­‐making	  literature,	  it	  is	  a	  complex	  state	  comprised	  of	  several	  dimensions	  that	  have	  been	  shown	  to	  independently	  affect	  the	  component	  processes	  of	  decision-­‐making.	  In	  particular,	  emotional	  valence	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  increase	  attention	  such	  that	  attention	  increases	  for	  mood-­‐congruent	  information	  (Bower,	  1981;	  Martin	  et	  al.,	  1991;	  Strauss	  &	  Allen,	  2006),	  and	  situational	  certainty	  has	  been	  shown	  to	  affect	  deliberation	  such	  that	  that	  emotions	  with	  a	  high	  level	  of	  uncertainty	  are	  associated	  with	  a	  more	  systematic	  deliberation	  style	  (Bohner	  &	  Weinerth,	  2001;	  Tiedens	  &	  Linton,	  2001).	  The	  goal	  of	  the	  present	  study	  was	  to	  further	  research	  on	  emotion	  and	  preferential	  choice	  by	  investigating	  the	  concurrent	  effects	  of	  valence	  and	  certainty	  on	  component	  processes	  of	  decision-­‐making	  using	  mathematical	  modeling.	  Specifically,	  we	  aimed	  to	  determine	  whether	  the	  effects	  of	  valence	  and	  certainty	  on	  attention	  and	  information	  accumulation	  threshold,	  respectively,	  would	  affect	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  in	  a	  preferential	  choice	  scenario.	  The	  present	  study	  had	  three	  main	  hypotheses:	  first,	  that	  the	  valence	  associated	  with	  a	  participant’s	  emotional	  state	  affects	  how	  attention	  is	  differentially	  deployed	  to	  features	  with	  positive	  or	  negative	  framing;	  second,	  that	  the	  certainty	  associated	  with	  a	  participant’s	  emotional	  state	  affects	  how	  systematically	  they	  consider	  the	  features	  of	  each	  of	  the	  alternatives	  in	  the	  choice	  set;	  and	  third,	  that	  the	  concurrent	  effects	  of	  valence	  and	  certainty	  influences	  the	  similarity	  effect.	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Participants	  first	  underwent	  an	  Anger	  emotion	  manipulation,	  a	  Fear	  emotion	  manipulation,	  or	  no	  emotion	  manipulation	  (Control).	  All	  participants	  then	  completed	  a	  preferential	  choice	  task	  that	  was	  designed	  to	  elicit	  the	  similarity	  effect.	  Each	  choice	  set	  contained	  three	  apartments	  that	  were	  rated	  along	  two	  features:	  size	  and	  location.	  To	  measure	  mood-­‐congruent	  attention,	  the	  features	  were	  framed	  positively	  or	  negatively	  in	  terms	  of	  how	  they	  compared	  to	  a	  hypothetical	  current	  apartment	  that	  could	  not	  be	  chosen.	  A	  feature	  was	  “positively”	  framed	  when	  all	  of	  the	  alternatives	  were	  rated	  higher	  than	  the	  current	  apartment	  for	  that	  feature,	  and	  a	  feature	  was	  “negatively”	  framed	  when	  all	  of	  the	  alternatives	  were	  rated	  lower	  than	  the	  current	  apartment	  for	  that	  feature.	  This	  resulted	  in	  four	  framing	  conditions:	  positive	  location,	  positive	  size;	  positive	  location,	  negative	  size;	  negative	  location,	  positive	  size;	  and	  negative	  location,	  negative	  size.	  	  The	  first	  hypothesis	  that	  Anger	  and	  Fear,	  but	  not	  Control,	  would	  exhibit	  increased	  attention	  for	  features	  that	  were	  framed	  negatively	  in	  the	  incongruent	  framing	  conditions	  was	  not	  supported.	  Instead,	  both	  the	  behavioral	  and	  modeling	  results	  suggest	  that	  all	  participants	  exhibited	  an	  increase	  for	  negatively	  framed	  features	  regardless	  of	  emotion	  condition.	  The	  second	  hypothesis	  that	  situational	  certainty	  would	  affect	  deliberation	  was	  weakly	  supported	  by	  the	  finding	  that	  Anger	  participants	  exhibited	  a	  greater	  likelihood	  of	  choosing	  the	  preferred	  alternative	  in	  a	  given	  choice	  set,	  as	  predicted	  by	  the	  standard	  three-­‐choice	  version	  of	  the	  MDFT.	  However,	  the	  second	  hypothesis	  was	  not	  supported	  in	  the	  reaction	  time	  data,	  in	  which	  no	  differences	  were	  found,	  nor	  in	  the	  model	  fits,	  which	  suggested	  that	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participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions	  both	  exhibited	  higher	  thresholds	  than	  participants	  in	  the	  Control	  condition.	  	  The	  third	  hypothesis	  that	  the	  magnitude	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  would	  differ	  between	  emotion	  conditions	  was	  not	  supported	  statistically,	  nor	  is	  it	  perfectly	  predicted	  by	  any	  of	  the	  models.	  However,	  there	  is	  a	  consistent	  trend	  throughout	  each	  framing	  condition	  in	  which	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  condition	  exhibited	  a	  greater	  similarity	  effect	  than	  participants	  in	  the	  Control	  or	  Fear	  conditions,	  and	  this	  effect	  was	  significant	  in	  both	  of	  the	  congruent	  framing	  conditions.	  Because	  Fear	  and	  Anger	  are	  both	  negative	  emotions	  that	  differ	  in	  certainty	  (Lerner	  &	  Keltner,	  2000),	  the	  differing	  choice	  patterns	  between	  Fear	  and	  Anger	  highlight	  the	  need	  to	  study	  emotions	  as	  complex	  states	  rather	  than	  single	  emotional	  dimensions	  such	  as	  arousal	  or	  valence	  alone.	  	  There	  was	  a	  surprising	  effect	  when	  both	  size	  and	  location	  were	  framed	  negatively	  in	  which	  the	  similarity	  effect	  reversed,	  and	  to	  a	  significantly	  larger	  extent	  for	  participants	  in	  the	  Anger	  condition.	  Though	  outside	  of	  the	  primary	  hypotheses	  of	  the	  present	  study,	  this	  is	  an	  intriguing	  result	  that	  to	  our	  knowledge	  has	  not	  been	  previously	  reported	  in	  the	  literature.	  Interestingly,	  a	  simple	  modification	  to	  the	  MDFT	  in	  which	  the	  current	  apartment	  was	  included	  in	  the	  deliberation	  process,	  but	  not	  allowed	  to	  be	  selected,	  predicted	  the	  reversal	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  for	  trials	  in	  which	  both	  features	  were	  framed	  negatively.	  Such	  a	  modification	  did	  not	  improve	  predictions	  in	  the	  MLBA.	  As	  previously	  discussed,	  as	  an	  alternative	  to	  the	  MDFT’s	  account,	  it	  is	  also	  possible	  that	  participants	  are	  heuristically	  choosing	  the	  apartment	  that	  never	  suffers	  the	  greatest	  “loss”	  in	  either	  size	  or	  location	  in	  comparison	  to	  the	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current	  apartment.	  Regardless,	  this	  effect	  suggests	  that	  the	  framing	  manipulation	  influenced	  deliberation	  on	  a	  deeper	  level	  than	  its	  intended	  effects	  on	  attentional	  deployment.	  The	  observed	  reversal	  of	  the	  similarity	  effect	  has	  multiple	  implications	  for	  the	  decision-­‐making	  literature.	  At	  minimum,	  the	  MDFT	  simulations	  suggest	  that	  researchers	  should	  be	  cognizant	  of	  the	  potential	  presence,	  and	  influence,	  of	  unintended	  or	  “illusory”	  alternatives	  when	  designing	  preferential	  choice	  tasks,	  either	  in	  their	  stimuli	  or	  from	  participants’	  own	  experiences.	  For	  example,	  in	  a	  paradigm	  in	  which	  a	  participant	  is	  asked	  to	  choose	  a	  new	  camera	  for	  herself,	  the	  participant’s	  behavior	  may	  be	  influenced	  by	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  camera	  that	  she	  actually	  owns.	  On	  a	  more	  theoretical	  level,	  this	  finding	  may	  serve	  as	  an	  evaluative	  measure	  for	  models	  of	  preferential	  choice	  as	  it	  appears	  to	  serve	  as	  a	  distinguishing	  factor	  between	  the	  MDFT	  and	  the	  MLBA	  in	  the	  present	  study.	  Future	  model	  development	  may	  benefit	  from	  accounting	  for	  the	  effects	  of	  illusory	  alternatives	  on	  preferential	  choice	  behavior.	  Given	  these	  implications	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  further	  and	  more	  targeted	  study	  of	  this	  effect	  is	  warranted.	  The	  present	  study	  has	  a	  few	  limitations.	  First,	  a	  technical	  error	  invalidated	  one	  of	  the	  expected	  value	  conditions,	  which	  cut	  the	  within-­‐subjects	  sample	  size	  by	  half.	  Even	  with	  these	  trials,	  however,	  the	  sample	  size	  would	  not	  be	  high	  enough	  to	  calculate	  informative	  choice	  proportions	  for	  each	  participant	  in	  each	  framing	  condition,	  as	  done	  in	  previous	  research	  on	  the	  similarity	  effect	  (e.g.,	  Trueblood	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  The	  low	  number	  of	  trials	  was	  decided	  upon	  in	  order	  to	  minimize	  the	  probability	  of	  the	  fragile	  emotion	  manipulation	  wearing	  off	  before	  the	  choice	  task	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was	  complete.	  Future	  studies	  may	  consider	  striking	  more	  of	  a	  balance	  between	  manipulation	  effect	  concerns	  and	  the	  need	  for	  high	  within-­‐subjects	  power.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  present	  study	  also	  suggest	  that	  behavior	  was	  affected	  by	  the	  fixed	  order	  in	  which	  alternatives	  were	  presented,	  as	  participants	  took	  significantly	  less	  time	  to	  respond	  to	  trials	  in	  which	  the	  similar	  alternatives	  in	  a	  set	  were	  adjacent.	  Future	  studies	  should	  also	  be	  cautious	  to	  randomize	  the	  order	  in	  which	  alternatives	  are	  presented.	  Lastly,	  it	  is	  possible	  that	  no	  differences	  were	  found	  in	  the	  reaction	  time	  data	  due	  to	  the	  potential	  increase	  in	  variability	  of	  reaction	  times	  collected	  in	  online	  studies	  as	  a	  result	  of	  variability	  in	  the	  technology	  used	  by	  participants	  to	  access	  the	  study.	  An	  in-­‐person	  replication	  of	  the	  present	  study	  may	  be	  informative	  in	  this	  regard.	  The	  results	  of	  the	  present	  study	  did	  not	  provide	  clear	  and	  full	  support	  for	  all	  three	  hypotheses.	  However,	  they	  do	  support	  the	  merits	  of	  targeting	  the	  interactions	  of	  underlying	  mechanisms	  in	  studies	  of	  complex	  processes.	  Our	  results	  suggest	  that	  attention,	  a	  component	  process	  of	  decision-­‐making,	  had	  large	  effects	  on	  choice	  outcomes.	  Anger	  and	  Fear,	  two	  emotional	  states	  that	  are	  similar	  in	  valence	  but	  not	  certainty,	  exhibited	  differing	  choice	  patterns.	  Mathematical	  modeling	  also	  proved	  to	  be	  a	  useful	  method	  of	  studying	  the	  effects	  of	  interest.	  Though	  neither	  the	  MDFT	  nor	  the	  MLBA	  could	  predict	  all	  of	  the	  observed	  patterns	  in	  the	  data,	  the	  MDFT	  offered	  an	  account	  of	  the	  reverse	  similarity	  effect	  and	  both	  models	  can	  explain	  the	  effects	  of	  attention	  on	  choice	  outcomes	  in	  the	  incongruent	  framing	  conditions.	  Future	  studies	  are	  urged	  to	  pursue	  research	  on	  emotion	  and	  decision-­‐making	  that	  emphasizes	  the	  potentially	  multiple	  interactions	  of	  component	  states	  and	  processes.	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Table 1: Non-target Aggregate Groups in the DES 	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Table 2: Results of Multinomial Logistic Regression: Choice ~ 
Emotion:Framing:Similarity 	  
 X / S Y / S 
 β OR SE β OR SE 
Intercept ** 0.59 1.80 0.19 ** 0.57 1.78 0.19 
Anger * -0.55 0.58 0.28 -0.21 0.81 0.27 
Fear -0.26 0.77 0.28 -0.05 0.94 0.28 
-L, -S -0.06 0.94 0.28 -0.13 0.88 0.28 
-L, +S -0.08 0.92 0.34 *** 1.22 3.39 0.31 
+L, -S ***-1.09 0.33 0.26 ***-1.41 0.24 0.28 
Sy 0.39 1.48 0.29 0.32 1.37 0.29 
Anger: -L, -S * 0.96 2.61 0.40 0.27 1.31 0.40 
Fear: -L, -S 0.15 1.17 0.39 -0.23 0.79 0.39 
Anger: -L, +S -0.00 0.99 0.49 0.02 1.03 0.42 
Fear: -L, +S -0.17 0.84 0.49 -0.16 0.85 0.43 
Anger: +L, -S 0.16 1.17 0.38 -0.30 0.74 0.39 
Fear: +L, -S 0.19 1.21 0.38 -0.02 0.98 0.39 
Anger: Sy 0.37 1.45 0.41 -0.08 0.92 0.41 
Fear: Sy -0.10 0.90 0.41 -0.26 0.77 0.41 
-L, -S: Sy -0.26 0.78 0.41 0.26 1.30 0.41 
-L, +S: Sy ***-1.83 0.16 0.45 ***-2.33 0.09 0.41 
+L, -S: Sy ***-1.79 6.03 0.41 * 0.99 2.72 0.44 
Anger: -L, -S: Sy -0.47 0.62 0.59 0.18 1.20 0.59 
Fear: -L, -S: Sy 0.35 1.42 0.58 0.35 1.42 0.58 
Anger: -L, +S: Sy -0.19 0.83 0.65 -0.37 0.69 0.58 
Fear: -L, +S: Sy -0.45 1.58 0.64 0.09 1.09 0.58 
Anger: +L, -S: Sy 0.00 1.00 0.58 0.35 1.43 0.64 
Fear: +L, -S: Sy 0.32 1.37 0.59 0.79 2.19 0.63 
Note: The baseline model predicts the probability of choosing S given that the individual 
in the Control condition, S was similar to X, and both size and location were framed 
positively. Only the EV=2.5 condition was used. 
 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 3: Results of Three-Way ANOVA: Page Submit RT ~ 
Emotion:Framing:Similarity 	  
 First Selection RT 
 df SS MS F p 
Emotion 2 1.50 0.74 0.46 0.634 
Framing 3 6.20 2.08 9.15 *** <0.001 
Similarity 1 5.28 5.28 29.11 *** <0.001 
Emotion*Framing 6 0.60 0.10 0.45 0.845 
Emotion*Similarity 2 0.39 0.19 1.08 0.340 
Framing*Similarity 3 1.70 0.56 2.68  * 0.046 
Emotion*Framing*Similarity 6 1.50 0.25 1.19 0.309 
Note: Reaction time data is log-transformed. Only the EV=2.5 condition was used. 
 
* p < 0.05; ** p < 0.01; *** p < 0.001 
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Table 4: Best-fitting Parameter Values from the Four-Choice MLBA 	  
Condition Threshold λp λn I0 βsize βnegative ML 
Anger 
 










1.848 2.880 < 0.001 0.999 3.310 -7873.00 
Note:	  The	  λp	  and	  λn	  parameters	  represent	  the	  weights	  on	  positive	  and	  negative	  comparisons,	  respectively.	  The	  I0	  parameter	  is	  the	  positive	  constant	  that	  is	  added	  to	  the	  average	  drift	  rate	  of	  each	  alternative.	  The	  βsize	  and	  βnegative	  parameters	  represent	  the	  weights	  on	  size	  and	  negative	  framing,	  respectively.	  ML	  is	  maximum	  log	  likelihood.	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Figure 1: Multialternative Decision Field Theory  	   	  
376 ROE, BUSEMEYER, AND TOWNSEND
Connectionist Interpretation
Figure 3 provides an interpretation of the multialternative dy-
namic model as a connectionist network.3 The first layer is a
connectionist feed-forward network (Rumelhart & McClelland,
1986). The evaluation nodes (labeled M) to the left of the figure
represent the evaluations of each alternative on each attribute. For
example, if the decision is to choose among three cars on the basis
of quality and economy attributes, then there are six possible
evaluations. (Of course, a real car purchase entails many more
attributes and alternatives.) These evaluations are filtered by mo-
mentary attention weights (labeled W) linked to the attributes.
Subsequently, the weighted evaluations are transformed by con-
trast coefficients (labeled C) to produce comparisons among the
weighted evaluations. The outputs of the first layer (labeled V) in
Figure 3 are the valences, which represent the advantage or dis-
advantage being considered for each alternative at a particular time
point. These valences change stochastically over time as the deci-
sion maker's attention shifts unpredictably from one attribute to
another.
The second layer in Figure 3 is a competitive recursive network
(Grossberg, 1982; Grossberg, 1988; Rumelhart & McClelland,
1986). The three nodes (labeled A, B, and C) represent the three
choice alternatives (e.g., three cars). More generally, one decision
node in the recursive network corresponds to each choice alterna-
tive. The input into each decision node is the valence from the first
layer. The output activation from each decision node represents the
strength of preference for the corresponding alternative at a par-
ticular point in time. The activation level increases with positive
valences (advantages) and decreases with negative valences (dis-
advantages). Thus, the activation of a choice node at any point in
time represents the strength of the evolving preference formed by
the temporal integration of the stream of input valences.
Each decision node in the network is connected with every other
node and each decision node also has a self-feedback loop. The
*• PC
Figure 3. Connectionist interpretation of multialternative decision field
theory consisting of two layers. The first layer is a connectionist feed-
forward network. The evaluations (labeled M) to the left of the figure
represent the evaluations of each alternative on each attribute. These
evaluations are filtered by momentary attention weights (labeled W) linked
to the attributes. Subsequently, the weighted evaluations are transformed
by contrast coefficients (labeled C) to produce comparisons among the
weighted evaluations. The outputs of the first layer (labeled V) are the
valences. The second layer is a competitive recursive network. The three
nodes (labeled A, B, and C) represent the three choice alternatives (e.g.,
three cars). Each node is connected to every other node and has a self-
feedback loop. The values of these connections are given in S, the feedback
matrix. The outputs are preferences (labeled P).
self-feedback loop integrates the valences for a given option over
time, allowing activation within a node to grow or decay. The
interconnections among nodes represent a competitive system so
that activation of one node inhibits the other nodes. The intercon-
nection strengths are assumed to be a decreasing function of the
perceived dissimilarity between alternatives within the multiat-
tribute space. This corresponds to the principle of lateral inhibition
used in competitive neural networks. Lateral inhibition is a key
principle for producing edge enhancement effects and Mach band
effects in perception (see Cornsweet, 1970). In this application, the
lateral inhibition effects are used to produce bolstering or justifi-
cation effects observed in decision making (Janis & Mann, 1976;
Simonson, 1989). This completes the presentation of the basic
theory, and now we turn to several important empirical applica-
tions for multialternative preferential choice.
Applications of MDFT to Central Empirical Findings
Predictions for the Similarity Effect
According to MDFT, the following explanation causes the sim-
ilarity effect. Consider the choice among options A, B, and S in
Figure 1. Whenever attention happens to focus on the quality
attribute, then both options A and S gain advantages while option
B gets a disadvantage. Likewise, whenever attention happens to
focus on the economy attribute, then both options A and S get
disadvantages while option B gains an advantage. Thus, the va-
lences of A and S are positively correlated with each other and
negatively correlated with B. Participants who tend to focus more
on economy will choose option B whereas participants who tend to
focus more on quality will choose either A or S. Thus S only hurts
or takes away choices from option A and not option B. A more
formal explanation is presented below, after a discussion of the
details about the assignment of parameters of Equation 2 to the
conditions indicated in Figure 1.
According to the value structure shown in Figure 1, car A is high
on quality and low on economy whereas car B is just the opposite.
Car S is similar to A but slightly lower on economy and slightly
better on quality. This pattern of evaluations can be represented in









The precise numerical values are not critical to produce the pre-
dicted pattern from the model, as long as S is a competitive
alternative with values close to option A.
The attention weights, tWE(r), WQ(0], were assumed to fluctuate
over time steps according to a simple Bernoulli process. Specifi-
cally, the probability of attending to the economy attribute was
assigned a probability WB, and the probability of attending to the
3 The connectionist interpretation presented here uses a local rather than
a distributed representation of the input features (see Rumelhart & Mc-
Clelland, 1986). The local representation was chosen because it provides a
more direct relation to previous theories in decision making. It is possible
to employ a distributed representation, but this was not required for the
phenomena considered here.
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Figure 3: Multiattribute Linear Ballistic Accumulator 	   	  
experimental designs (e.g., Huber et al., 1982; Simonson, 1989;
Tversky, 1972), the new experiments reported by Trueblood
(2012) and Trueblood et al. (2013) found all three effects with the
same stimuli. In these cases, it is unclear why there should be
different noise parameters for the different effects.
Besides instability problems, MDFT is also restricted in explain-
ing experimental results involving the compromise effect. In
MDFT, the compromise effect is explained by the correlation of
extreme options. Because the extreme options are far apart in the
indifference/dominance space, there are weak inhibitory connec-
tions between these options. However, there are strong inhibitory
connections between the compromise option and the two extremes.
Due to these strong and weak interconnections, the momentary
preference states for the extreme options become anticorrelated
with the compromise option and correlated with each other. The
correlated extremes split their winnings and are selected less often
than the compromise option.
Usher, Elhalal, and McClelland (2008) experimentally tested
temporal correlation in the compromise effect. In their experiment,
subjects were given a ternary choice set and asked to choose one
of the options. Then, after the selection was made, subjects were
told that their preferred option was no longer available and were
asked to choose again. If extreme options are correlated, as in
MDFT, when one extreme is initially selected, the other also has a
high level of activation, and so is more likely to be selected as the
second choice. However, experimental results showed that the
compromise option was selected more often following an initial
choice of an extreme. Tsetsos et al. (2010) demonstrated through
simulations that the LCA model makes the correct prediction,
unlike MDFT. Hotaling et al. (2010) argued that MDFT can
account for the results of Usher et al. (2008) if asymmetric atten-
tion weighting is allowed. They argued that an extreme option is
only initially selected if an individual is attending to one dimen-
sion more than the other.
This discussion illustrates that there are several limitations to
both MDFT and the LCA model. We propose the MLBA model in
attempt to overcome these limitations. First, the model has simple
analytic solutions for both internally and externally controlled
decision tasks and can easily be fit to data using either procedure.
The model does not assume loss aversion, so can explain the
presence of context effects across a number of domains. Further, it
does not suffer from the same instabilities as MDFT with regard to
the compromise effect.
The Multiattribute Linear Ballistic
Accumulator Model
The MLBA model is an extension of the linear ballistic accu-
mulator (LBA) model developed by Brown and Heathcote (2008).
It also incorporates the LCA model’s use of pairwise differences in
calculating the inputs to each accumulator. We begin with a
discussion of the LBA model and then provide a detailed descrip-
tion of the MLBA model.
The Linear Ballistic Accumulator Model
The LBA models choice and response times using indepen-
dent accumulators that race toward a threshold. The accumula-
tors are linear and accumulate information deterministically
during a trial. Deterministic accumulation leads to greater math-
ematically tractability than stochastic models with moment-to-
moment fluctuations in information, but the LBA can still
accommodate benchmark empirical phenomena including pre-
dicting fast and slow errors and the shape of speed–accuracy
trade-off curves (Brown & Heathcote, 2008). The model has a
closed-form analytic likelihood function for choices between
any number of alternatives, making it easy to apply to data
(derivations for the LBA model’s likelihood functions can be
found in the appendix of Brown & Heathcote, 2008). The
analytic solutions are a consequence of the simplifying assump-
tions that evidence accumulation is both linear and determinis-
tic. Although these assumptions probably do not reflect the true
state of neurophysiological processes (at least at a single-cell
level), the model’s success in accounting for both behavioral
and neural data suggests that the LBA’s trade-off between
veracity and simplicity is reasonable (Forstmann et al., 2008,
2010).
In the LBA model, a choice between three alternatives is rep-
resented by a race between three evidence accumulators. For
example, Figure 2 illustrates a choice among options {X, Y, Z}. At
the beginning of a trial, each accumulator starts at a randomly
determined amount of evidence drawn independently for each
accumulator from a uniform distribution on the interval [0, A]. The
accumulators’ activations increase at speeds defined by a drift rate
associated with each response choice, until one of the accumula-
 
Figure 2. The linear ballistic accumulator model with three accumulators
for options X, Y, and Z. Accumulators begin at randomly determined
starting points and increase at speeds determined by the drift rates. The first
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Figure 4: Influence of Attention and Accumulation Threshold on the Similarity 
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Figure 5: Predicted Effects of Emotion on Choice by the Three-Choice MDFT 	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Figure 6. Predicted Effects of Emotion on RT by the Three-Choice MDFT 	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Figure 7: Influence of Attention and Accumulation Threshold on the Similarity 
Effect as Predicted by the MLBA 
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Figure 8: Predicted Effects of Emotion on Choice by the Three-Choice MLBA 	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Figure 9: Predicted Effects of Emotion on RT by the Three-Choice MLBA 	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Figure 10: Sample Stimuli 	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Figure 11: Sample Catch Trial 	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Figure 15: Distributions of Average Responses to the Arousal Items by Condition 
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Figure 16: Choice Proportions  
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Figure 17: Differences in Choice Proportions Between S Similarity Levels  
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Figure 18: Log-transformed Reaction Times for the Response Submission 	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Figure 19: Predicted Effects of Emotion on Choice by the Four-Choice MDFT 	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Figure 20: Predicted Effects of Emotion on RT by the Four-Choice MDFT 
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Figure 21: Predicted Effects of Emotion on Choice by the Four-Choice MLBA 
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Figure 22: Predicted Effects of Emotion on RT by the Four-Choice MLBA 
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Figure 23: Differences in Choice Proportions Between S Similarity Levels, Based on 
the Best-Fitting MLBA Parameter Values  	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Figure 24: Differences in RT Between S Similarity Levels, Based on the Best-Fitting 
MLBA Parameter Values   
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APPENDIX	  A	  	  
MULTIALTERNATIVE	  DECISION	  FIELD	  THEORY	  This	  appendix	  describes	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  MDFT	  (Roe	  et	  al.,	  2001)	  and	  the	  specific	  parameter	  values	  used	  to	  simulate	  the	  similarity	  effect	  in	  both	  the	  three-­‐	  and	  four-­‐choice	  scenarios.	  Both	  cases	  assume	  an	  internally	  set	  threshold.	  The	  subscript	  “Sx”	  denotes	  the	  (X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  choice	  set	  and	  the	  subscript	  “Sy”	  denotes	  the	  (X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  choice	  set.	  
A.1	  Three-­‐Choice	  Scenario	  The	  model	  begins	  with	  a	  matrix	  M	  that	  represents	  the	  ratings	  of	  each	  alternative,	  which	  were	  chosen	  based	  on	  the	  simulations	  conducted	  by	  Roe	  et	  al	  (2001):	  	  
𝑀!" = 12.2 28.230.0 10.011.0 29.0 	  
𝑀!" = 12.2 28.230.0 10.030.8 8.8 	  	  The	  left-­‐hand	  column	  represents	  ratings	  of	  each	  apartment’s	  size	  while	  the	  right-­‐hand	  column	  represents	  ratings	  of	  each	  apartment’s	  location.	  The	  rows	  represent	  apartments	  X,	  Y,	  and	  S,	  from	  top	  to	  bottom.	  	  The	  M	  matrix	  is	  multiplied	  by	  a	  weight	  vector	  W	  that	  determines	  the	  amount	  of	  attention	  each	  feature	  receives	  at	  a	  given	  point	  in	  time,	  t.	  The	  number	  of	  features	  determines	  the	  length	  of	  the	  vector.	  Attention	  is	  deployed	  to	  each	  feature	  in	  an	  all-­‐
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or-­‐none	  fashion	  such	  that	  a	  feature	  is	  activated	  by	  a	  value	  of	  “1”	  and	  all	  other	  features	  are	  inhibited	  by	  a	  value	  of	  “0”.	  Therefore,	  W	  takes	  one	  of	  two	  forms	  in	  the	  present	  study:	  	   𝑊! = 1 0 	  𝑊! = 0 1 	  	  Whether	  WS	  or	  WL	  is	  used	  on	  a	  given	  trial	  is	  determined	  probabilistically	  by	  w,	  whose	  value	  ranges	  from	  0-­‐1.	  A	  random	  number	  is	  generated	  on	  each	  pass	  through	  the	  model.	  If	  that	  number	  is	  less	  than	  w,	  WS	  is	  used.	  Otherwise,	  WL	  is	  used.	  Multiplying	  the	  M	  matrix	  by	  WS	  produces	  a	  matrix	  identical	  to	  M	  but	  with	  all	  location	  ratings	  set	  to	  0,	  and	  multiplying	  the	  M	  matrix	  by	  WL	  produces	  a	  matrix	  identical	  to	  M	  but	  with	  all	  size	  ratings	  set	  to	  0.	  For	  the	  simulated	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  participants,	  w	  was	  set	  to	  .8	  when	  size	  was	  framed	  negatively	  and	  location	  was	  framed	  positively;	  .2	  when	  size	  was	  framed	  positively	  and	  location	  was	  framed	  negatively;	  and	  .5	  when	  the	  two	  features	  were	  framed	  congruently.	  For	  the	  simulated	  Control	  participants,	  w	  was	  always	  set	  to	  .5.	  The	  matrix	  product	  of	  M	  and	  W	  is	  then	  multiplied	  by	  a	  contrast	  matrix	  C,	  which	  serves	  to	  contrast	  the	  weighted	  value	  of	  one	  alternative	  against	  the	  average	  weighted	  values	  of	  n	  remaining	  alternatives:	  	  
𝐶 = 1 −1/𝑛 −1/𝑛−1/𝑛 1 −1/𝑛−1/𝑛 −1/𝑛 1 	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   The	  valences	  of	  each	  alternative	  at	  time	  t	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  matrix	  product	  of	  the	  above	  operation	  plus	  error	  (SD=7):	  	   𝑉 𝑡 = 𝐶𝑀𝑊 𝑡 + 𝜖(𝑡)	  	   The	  preference	  strength	  of	  each	  alternative	  at	  time	  t	  is	  calculated	  by	  adding	  
V(t)	  to	  the	  product	  of	  the	  previous	  preference	  strength	  P	  (0	  when	  t=1)	  and	  a	  feedback	  matrix	  S:	  	   𝑃 𝑡 + 1 = 𝑆𝑃 𝑡 + 𝑉(𝑡 + 1)	  	  The	  matrix	  S	  serves	  to	  determine	  the	  degree	  of	  competition	  between	  alternatives	  via	  inter-­‐connective	  feedback	  loops	  (off-­‐diagonal	  values)	  and	  the	  degree	  of	  each	  alternative’s	  own	  growth	  or	  decay	  over	  time	  via	  self-­‐connective	  feedback	  loops	  (diagonal	  values):	  	  
𝑆!" = . 95 −.003 −.09−.003 . 95 −.003−.09 −.003 . 95 	  
𝑆!" = . 95 −.003 −.003−.003 . 95 −.09−.003 −.09 . 95 	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Negative	  values	  in	  the	  matrix	  represent	  inhibition	  while	  positive	  values	  represent	  activation.	  Thus,	  self-­‐connections	  facilitate	  growth	  of	  a	  given	  alternative’s	  preference	  strength	  while	  inter-­‐connections	  facilitate	  decay.	  Alternatives	  whose	  ratings	  are	  more	  similar	  to	  one	  another	  are	  more	  negative	  to	  produce	  increased	  competition.	  	  	   An	  alternative	  was	  chosen	  once	  its	  preference	  strength	  P	  exceeded	  the	  predetermined	  threshold	  value.	  Reaction	  time	  was	  defined	  as	  the	  number	  of	  iterations	  of	  the	  model	  necessary	  for	  at	  least	  one	  alternative	  to	  exceed	  the	  threshold.	  The	  threshold	  value	  was	  set	  to	  40	  for	  the	  simulated	  Anger	  participants,	  60	  for	  the	  simulated	  Control	  participants,	  and	  80	  for	  the	  simulated	  Fear	  participants.	  Ten	  thousand	  synthetic	  subjects	  were	  run	  through	  the	  model.	  
A.2	  Four-­‐Choice	  Scenario	  The	  similarity	  effect	  was	  simulated	  in	  a	  four-­‐choice	  scenario	  assuming	  the	  same	  process	  as	  in	  the	  three-­‐choice	  scenario,	  but	  with	  modified	  parameter	  values	  to	  reflect	  the	  expanded	  choice	  set.	  Only	  the	  modifications	  are	  described	  below.	  Ratings	  for	  the	  fourth	  option	  C	  were	  added	  to	  the	  M	  matrix.	  Recall	  that	  four	  versions	  of	  C	  were	  used	  in	  this	  study:	  C++,	  C+-­‐,	  C-­‐+,	  and	  C-­‐-­‐	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  Therefore,	  the	  values	  of	  the	  fourth	  row	  in	  M	  depended	  on	  which	  version	  of	  C	  was	  used	  in	  a	  given	  trial:	  	   𝑀!!! = 9.8 8.4 	  𝑀!!! = 9.8 29.8 	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𝑀!!! = 31.6 8.4 	  𝑀!!! = 31.6 29.8 	  	  	   A	  fourth	  row	  and	  column	  were	  added	  to	  the	  S	  matrix	  to	  include	  values	  representing	  the	  C	  self-­‐	  and	  inter-­‐connections.	  The	  inter-­‐connections	  were	  estimated	  to	  be	  relatively	  small	  under	  the	  assumption	  that	  apartment	  C	  would	  be	  unlikely	  to	  compete	  strongly	  with	  other	  alternatives	  since	  it	  was	  not	  actually	  a	  viable	  option.	  Specifically,	  the	  values	  of	  C’s	  interconnections	  were	  either	  .0005	  or	  .001	  depending	  on	  how	  similar	  C	  was	  to	  each	  alternative	  in	  a	  given	  choice	  set:	  	  
𝑆!"#!!|!! = . 95 −.003 −.09 −.0005−.003 . 95 −.003 −.0005−.09 −.003 . 95 −.0005−.0005 −.0005 −.0005 . 95 	  
𝑆!"#!!|!! = . 95 −.003 −.003 −.0005−.003 . 95 −.09 −.0005−.003 −.09 . 95 −.0005−.0005 −.0005 −.0005 . 95 	  
𝑆!"#!! = . 95 −.003 −.09 −.0005−.003 . 95 −.003 −.001−.09 −.003 . 95 −.0005−.0005 −.001 −.0005 . 95 	  
𝑆!"#!! = . 95 −.003 −.003 −.0005−.003 . 95 −.09 −.001−.003 −.09 . 95 −.001−.0005 −.001 −.001 . 95 	  
𝑆!"#!! = . 95 −.003 −.09 −.001−.003 . 95 −.003 −.0005−.09 −.003 . 95 −.001−.001 −.0005 −.001 . 95 	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𝑆!"#!! = . 95 −.003 −.003 −.001−.003 . 95 −.09 −.0005−.003 −.09 . 95 −.0005−.001 −.0005 −.0005 . 95 	  	  As	  before,	  an	  alternative	  was	  chosen	  once	  its	  preference	  strength	  P	  exceeded	  the	  predetermined	  threshold	  value.	  However,	  only	  the	  preference	  strengths	  of	  alternatives	  X,	  Y,	  and	  S	  were	  evaluated,	  and	  C	  could	  therefore	  never	  be	  selected.	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APPENDIX	  B	  
	  
THE	  MULTIATTRIBUTE	  LINEAR	  BALLISTIC	  ACCUMULATOR	  This	  appendix	  describes	  the	  implementation	  of	  the	  MLBA	  (Trueblood	  et	  al.,	  2014)	  and	  the	  specific	  parameter	  values	  used	  to	  simulate	  the	  similarity	  effect	  in	  both	  the	  three-­‐	  and	  four-­‐choice	  scenarios.	  Both	  cases	  assume	  an	  internally	  set	  threshold.	  The	  subscript	  “Sx”	  denotes	  the	  (X,	  Y,	  Sx)	  choice	  set	  and	  the	  subscript	  “Sy”	  denotes	  the	  (X,	  Y,	  Sy)	  choice	  set.	  
B.1	  Three-­‐Choice	  Scenario	  The	  model	  begins	  by	  transforming	  the	  raw	  rating	  values	  into	  subjective	  rating	  values,	  u.	  The	  subjective	  mapping	  is	  premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  when	  two	  alternatives	  have	  the	  same	  average	  value	  the	  alternative	  whose	  individual	  feature	  ratings	  are	  most	  similar	  is	  to	  be	  preferred.	  For	  example,	  consider	  the	  apartments	  X	  and	  Sx:	  apartment	  X	  has	  a	  rating	  of	  2	  for	  size	  and	  3	  for	  location	  and	  apartment	  Sx	  has	  a	  rating	  of	  1.75	  for	  size	  and	  3.25	  for	  location,	  resulting	  in	  an	  average	  rating	  of	  2.5	  for	  both.	  However,	  the	  ratings	  for	  apartment	  Sx	  are	  more	  “dispersed”;	  that	  is,	  the	  difference	  between	  the	  ratings	  for	  apartment	  Sx	  along	  size	  and	  location	  (3.25-­‐1.75=1.5)	  is	  greater	  than	  the	  difference	  in	  the	  same	  ratings	  for	  apartment	  X	  (3-­‐2=1).	  Therefore,	  apartment	  X	  is	  to	  be	  preferred.	  The	  subjective	  mapping	  is	  governed	  by	  the	  parameter	  m	  such	  that	  if	  m	  >	  1	  options	  with	  less	  dispersion	  are	  preferred	  (see	  Figure	  B1)	  and	  if	  1	  >	  m	  >	  0	  options	  with	  greater	  dispersion	  are	  preferred.	  If	  m	  =	  1,	  the	  subjective	  rating	  values	  are	  equal	  to	  the	  raw	  rating	  values.	  For	  simplicity	  we	  have	  adopted	  the	  assumption	  that	  no	  subjective	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mapping	  of	  this	  quality	  occurs	  in	  the	  present	  paradigm,	  and	  have	  set	  m	  =	  1	  in	  all	  simulations	  and	  model	  fits.	  The	  values	  of	  u	  are	  therefore	  equal	  to	  the	  raw	  rating	  values,	  which	  were	  chosen	  based	  on	  the	  simulations	  conducted	  by	  Trueblood	  et	  al	  (2014):	  	  
𝑢!" = 2 33 21.75 3.25 	  
𝑢!" = 2 33 23.25 1.75 	  	  The	  left-­‐hand	  column	  represents	  ratings	  of	  each	  apartment’s	  size	  while	  the	  right-­‐hand	  column	  represents	  ratings	  of	  each	  apartment’s	  location.	  The	  rows	  represent	  apartments	  X,	  Y,	  and	  S,	  from	  top	  to	  bottom.	  	  The	  subjective	  rating	  values	  are	  then	  submitted	  to	  a	  valuation	  function	  V	  that	  calculates	  weighted	  contrasts	  of	  each	  alternative	  along	  each	  feature:	  	   𝑉!" = 𝑤!"# ∙ 𝑢!" − 𝑢!" + 𝑤!"# ∙ (𝑢!" − 𝑢!")	  	  The	  values	  of	  V	  are	  governed	  by	  attention	  weights	  that	  are	  calculated	  separately	  for	  each	  feature.	  The	  attention	  weights	  are	  premised	  on	  the	  assumption	  that	  comparisons	  between	  alternatives	  with	  rating	  values	  that	  are	  very	  similar,	  and	  therefore	  more	  difficult	  to	  discriminate,	  will	  receive	  more	  attention	  than	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comparisons	  between	  alternatives	  with	  dissimilar	  rating	  values.	  As	  such,	  attention	  weights	  are	  larger	  when	  ui	  and	  uj	  are	  similar	  and	  smaller	  when	  they	  are	  dissimilar:	  	   𝑤!"# = exp −𝜆   𝑢!" − 𝑢!"|  )	  𝑤!"# = exp −𝜆   𝑢!" − 𝑢!"|  )	  	  The	  attention	  weights	  are	  themselves	  governed	  by	  λ,	  whose	  value	  depends	  on	  whether	  ui	  –	  uj	  is	  positive	  or	  negative.	  If	  the	  difference	  is	  positive,	  λ	  =	  λ1,	  and	  if	  the	  difference	  is	  negative,	  λ	  =	  λ2.	  The	  MLBA	  claims	  that	  the	  similarity	  effect	  occurs	  when	  greater	  consideration	  is	  given	  to	  positive	  differences	  than	  to	  negative	  differences	  (λ1	  <	  λ2).	  The	  authors	  posit	  that	  the	  necessity	  of	  this	  asymmetry	  may	  reflect	  a	  role	  of	  confirmation	  bias	  in	  the	  similarity	  effect,	  such	  that	  positive	  differences	  represent	  confirmatory	  evidence	  while	  negative	  difference	  represent	  dis-­‐confirmatory	  evidence	  (Trueblood	  et	  al.,	  2014).	  In	  the	  present	  simulations	  and	  model	  fits	  λ1	  =	  .2	  and	  λ2	  =	  .4,	  resulting	  in	  greater	  attention	  to	  positive	  differences	  after	  exponentiation.	  	  	   The	  formula	  for	  V	  can	  be	  extended	  to	  include	  an	  additional	  parameter	  measuring	  attention	  for	  particular	  features,	  β.	  When	  the	  choice	  set	  includes	  only	  two	  features,	  the	  β	  parameter	  can	  take	  a	  single	  value	  that	  is	  multiplied	  by	  the	  contrast	  of	  just	  one	  of	  the	  features,	  such	  as	  location	  in	  the	  present	  study:	  	   𝑉!" = 𝑤!"# ∙ 𝑢!" − 𝑢!" + 𝑤!"# ∙ (𝑢!" − 𝑢!") ∙ 𝛽!	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  If	  0	  <	  β	  <	  1,	  less	  weight	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  contrast	  for	  location,	  reflecting	  decreased	  attention	  for	  location.	  If	  1	  <	  β,	  greater	  weight	  is	  placed	  on	  the	  contrast	  for	  attention,	  reflecting	  increased	  attention	  for	  location.	  	  The	  present	  study	  extended	  β	  to	  represent	  attention	  for	  location	  relative	  to	  size	  (βL)	  as	  well	  as	  attention	  for	  negatively	  framed	  features	  relative	  to	  positively-­‐framed	  features	  (βN).	  Both	  β	  parameters	  were	  combined	  into	  one	  summary	  importance	  weight	  for	  each	  feature,	  γ:	  	   𝛾!! = 1	  𝛾!! = 𝛽!	  𝛾!! = 𝛽!	  𝛾!! = 𝛽! ∙ 𝛽!	  	  The	  βS	  parameter	  was	  set	  to	  1	  for	  all	  conditions.	  For	  simulations	  of	  Control	  participants,	  the	  βN	  parameter	  was	  also	  set	  to	  1	  because	  Control	  participants	  were	  not	  expected	  to	  exhibit	  changes	  in	  attention	  for	  negatively	  framed	  features.	  For	  simulations	  of	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  participants,	  βN	  was	  set	  to	  2	  to	  simulate	  an	  increase	  in	  attention	  for	  negatively	  framed	  features.	  The	  values	  of	  V	  were	  then	  calculated	  as	  follows:	  	   𝑉!" = 𝑤!"# ∙ 𝑢!" − 𝑢!" ∙ 𝛾! + 𝑤!"# ∙ (𝑢!" − 𝑢!") ∙ 𝛾!	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The	  rate	  at	  which	  the	  preference	  strength	  approaches	  the	  decision	  threshold	  is	  determined	  by	  the	  mean	  drift	  rate	  di,	  which	  is	  the	  sum	  of	  all	  Vij	  and	  a	  positive	  constant	  I0:	  	   𝑑! = 𝑉!" + 𝑉!" + 𝐼!	  𝑑! = 𝑉!" + 𝑉!" + 𝐼!	  𝑑! = 𝑉!" + 𝑉!! + 𝐼!	  	  The	  drift	  rate	  for	  a	  given	  alternative	  on	  a	  particular	  trial	  is	  randomly	  sampled	  from	  N(di,	  s),	  in	  which	  s	  =	  1	  for	  all	  alternatives.	  	  The	  preference	  strength	  of	  each	  alternative	  begins	  at	  a	  value	  randomly	  sampled	  from	  a	  uniform	  distribution	  between	  0	  and	  A,	  which	  was	  fixed	  at	  1	  in	  both	  the	  simulations	  and	  model	  fits.	  The	  preference	  strength	  then	  grows	  or	  decays	  linearly	  at	  a	  rate	  of	  di(t)	  until	  at	  least	  one	  alternative	  exceeds	  the	  predetermined	  threshold	  value	  X.	  Given	  the	  linear	  relationship	  between	  time	  and	  preference	  strength,	  we	  defined	  the	  preferred	  alternative	  in	  a	  given	  trial	  as	  the	  alternative	  associated	  with	  the	  minimum	  of	  all	  values	  [	  X-­‐Ai(t)	  ]	  /	  di(t),	  and	  the	  value	  itself	  was	  recorded	  as	  the	  reaction	  time	  for	  that	  trial.	  The	  threshold	  value	  was	  set	  to	  40	  for	  the	  simulated	  Anger	  participants,	  60	  for	  the	  simulated	  Control	  participants,	  and	  80	  for	  the	  simulated	  Fear	  participants.	  Ten	  thousand	  synthetic	  subjects	  were	  run	  through	  the	  model.	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B.2	  Four-­‐Choice	  Scenario	  The	  similarity	  effect	  was	  simulated	  in	  a	  four-­‐choice	  scenario	  assuming	  the	  same	  process	  as	  in	  the	  three-­‐choice	  scenario,	  but	  with	  modified	  parameter	  values	  to	  reflect	  the	  expanded	  choice	  set.	  Only	  the	  modifications	  are	  described	  below.	  Ratings	  for	  the	  fourth	  option	  C	  were	  added	  to	  the	  u	  matrix.	  Recall	  that	  four	  versions	  of	  C	  were	  used	  in	  this	  study:	  C++,	  C+-­‐,	  C-­‐+,	  and	  C-­‐-­‐	  (see	  Figure	  2).	  Therefore,	  the	  values	  of	  the	  fourth	  row	  in	  M	  depended	  on	  which	  version	  of	  C	  was	  used	  in	  a	  given	  trial:	  	   𝑢!!! = 1.5 1.5 	  𝑢!!! = 1.5 3.5 	  𝑢!!! = 3.5 1.5 	  𝑢!!! = 3.5 3.5 	  	   As	  before,	  an	  alternative	  was	  chosen	  once	  its	  preference	  strength	  P	  exceeded	  the	  predetermined	  threshold	  value.	  However,	  only	  the	  preference	  strengths	  of	  alternatives	  X,	  Y,	  and	  S	  were	  evaluated,	  and	  C	  could	  therefore	  never	  be	  selected.	  
B.3	  Model	  Fitting	  Because	  the	  four-­‐choice	  simulations	  more	  closely	  approximated	  subject	  data	  than	  did	  the	  three-­‐choice	  simulations,	  model	  fitting	  was	  done	  using	  the	  four-­‐choice	  version	  of	  the	  MLBA.	  The	  subjects’	  response	  time	  distributions	  were	  fit	  to	  the	  likelihood	  function	  recommended	  in	  the	  seminal	  LBA	  paper	  (Brown	  &	  Heathcote,	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2008;	  eq.	  1-­‐3).	  The	  model	  was	  fit	  to	  aggregate	  data	  for	  each	  condition	  rather	  than	  to	  individual	  subjects	  due	  to	  the	  low	  within-­‐subjects	  sample	  size.	  However,	  we	  attempted	  to	  account	  for	  subject	  variability	  by	  first	  scaling	  subject	  response	  times	  within	  each	  condition	  before	  fitting	  the	  model.	  Scaling	  was	  done	  by	  first	  computing	  the	  z	  score	  for	  each	  individual	  subject,	  then	  multiplying	  the	  z-­‐score	  by	  the	  average	  standard	  deviation	  for	  the	  subject’s	  particular	  condition	  and	  finally	  adding	  the	  mean	  response	  time	  for	  that	  condition.	  	  The	  performance	  of	  the	  model	  is	  measured	  by	  the	  maximum	  log	  likelihood.	  The	  parameters	  A,	  s,	  and	  m	  were	  all	  fixed	  at	  1,	  as	  suggested	  in	  Trueblood	  et	  al	  (2014).	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Figure B1: Example of Subjective Mapping of Raw Rating Values in the MLBA 	  Reproduced	  from	  Trueblood,	  Brown,	  &	  Heathcote	  (2014).	   	  
to A). To allow for such violations, we follow Nosofsky (1991) in
using different parameterizations for wPij and wPji and likewise for
wQij and wQji. If the difference in attribute values is positive (e.g.,
uPi ! uPj ! 0), then we set " # "1. If the difference is negative,
we set " # "2.
Note that the attention weights do not add up to 1. The weights
are not meant to quantify the exact distribution of attention during
a trial. Rather, the weights capture the overall trend that similar,
difficult-to-discriminate options receive more attention than those
that are easy to discriminate. The weights are dependent on the
values of the attributes similar to those in multiattribute utility
theory (Keeney & Raiffa, 1976). However, unlike in multiattribute
utility theory, the weights do not represent the importance of the
attributes.
The constant I0 in Equation 1 ensures that at least one of the
mean drift rates is positive. This is necessary in order to avoid
nontermination in the LBA model.3 This value can be seen as a
baseline rate of evidence accumulation for the available options,
similar to I0 in the LCA model given in Equation B1.
In total, the MLBA model uses four free parameters to define
the mean drift rates: the curvature parameter m, the two decay
parameters "1 and "2 used to define the attention weights, and the
input constant I0. The model also has three additional parameters,
a starting point parameter A, a threshold parameter $, and a drift
rate noise parameter s. These additional parameters are fixed when
only modeling choice probabilities, but must be estimated if fitting
response times as well. Table 2 lists the model parameters and their
allowable ranges.
The MLBA model accounts for the attraction effect through the
attention weights wPij and wQij. Consider the choice set {X, Y, RX}
where RX is an inferior decoy near X. Because the distance be-
tween X and RX is smaller than the distance between Y and RX, the
attentions weights are larger for the comparison of X and RX than
Y and RX. Thus, the differences in subjective values for X and RX
receive more weight than the differences in subjective values for Y
and RX. Psychologically, the model predicts the attraction effect
occurs because X and RX are more difficult to discriminate than Y
and RX, which leads to increased attention to X and RX during the
evaluation process.
The model predicts that the similarity effect can occur when
people weight supportive information more than disconfirmatory
evidence. Consider the choice set {X, Y, SX} where SX is a
competitive option near X. In the valuation function VXSX, option X
acts as a reference point and option SX is evaluated relative to it. If
the decay constants obey "1 % "2, negative differences “decay”
faster than positive differences. In other words, evidence support-
ing the reference option X is weighted more than evidence against
X. Overall, this can lead to a small positive valuation VXSX because
the differences in subjective values are small (i.e., the distance
between X and SX is small) and positive differences receive more
weight than negative differences. Similarly, the comparison of
option Y to option SX can result in a large positive valuation VYSX
because the differences in subjective values are large (i.e., the
distance between Y and SX is large) and positive differences
receive more weight. Thus, the mean drift rate for Y can be larger
than the mean drift rate for X, leading to the similarity effect.
Asymmetry in attention weights where positive differences receive
more weight than negative differences could reflect a confirmation
bias (Nickerson, 1998). Research has suggested that people tend to
seek information that supports a selected point of view rather than
disconfirmatory evidence (Koriat, Lichtenstein, & Fischhoff,
1980). Although asymmetry of attention weights is a necessary
condition for producing the similarity effect, it is not necessary for
the attraction and compromise effects. These effects can arise for
any relationship between "1 and "2.
The compromise effect arises through the subjective value func-
tion given in Equation 2. This function allows for curvature that
can result in advantages for compromise options. For example, if
the m parameter is greater than 1, midrange options (i.e., those
with less attribute dispersion) are preferred to extremes, thus
producing a compromise effect. The compromise effect is further
enhanced through the attention weights wPij and wQij. Consider the
choice set {X, Y, CX} where Y and CX are extreme options and X
is the compromise. Because the distance between the compromise
and extremes is smaller than the distance between the two ex-
tremes, the attention weights are larger for the comparison of X to
Y and X to CX than comparisons of the extremes. This implies that
the differences in subjective values involving X receive more
weight than those involving extremes.
Model Predictions for Deliberation Time Effects
The MLBA model predicts that preferences are determined “in
expectation” during the front-end, preprocessing stage, but these
preferences are subject to random variation during the back-end
3 The MLBA model can be further constrained to ensure that all of the
drift rates are positive. This could be done in several different ways. For
example, I0 could be defined as the absolute value of the minimum of the
sums {V12 & V13, V21 & V23, V31 & V32} plus a constant. Another
alternative is to define the drift rates as an exponential function of the
binary comparisons, for example d1 # c· exp(V12 & V13). Positivity is not
necessary for termination in the LBA model. As long as one of the drift
rates is positive, the model can produce a decision.















Figure 3. Function used to map experimentally defined options to sub-
jective values. The curve is defined by one free parameter and can be
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C.1.1	  Participants	  A	  total	  of	  519	  participants	  (226	  in	  the	  Anger	  condition;	  223	  in	  the	  Fear	  condition)	  were	  recruited	  on	  Amazon’s	  Mechanical	  Turk	  (MTurk;	  Buhrmester	  et	  al.,	  2011).	  Of	  those	  participants	  49	  were	  excluded	  for	  not	  watching	  the	  video	  in	  full	  and	  21	  were	  excluded	  for	  technical	  difficulties	  leaving	  a	  total	  of	  449	  participants	  included	  in	  analyses.	  Participants	  were	  compensated	  $0.10	  for	  their	  time.	  
C.1.2	  Materials	  Twelve	  total	  videos	  were	  tested,	  with	  six	  videos	  tested	  for	  use	  in	  each	  of	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  emotion	  conditions	  from	  the	  main	  experiment.	  These	  emotional	  states	  were	  expected	  to	  allow	  us	  to	  assess	  behavioral	  differences	  across	  the	  two	  emotion	  components	  of	  interest,	  valence	  and	  certainty.	  Anger	  is	  associated	  with	  negative	  valence	  and	  high	  certainty,	  while	  Fear	  is	  associated	  with	  negative	  valence	  and	  low	  certainty	  (Tiedens	  &	  Linton,	  2001).	  	  	   The	  videos	  were	  selected	  from	  a	  previously	  published	  stimuli	  set	  (Schaefer	  et	  al.,	  2010).	  The	  videos	  that	  were	  tested	  for	  the	  Anger	  category	  include	  a	  scene	  depicting	  a	  police	  interrogation	  from	  In	  the	  Name	  of	  the	  Father	  (3:30;	  N=31);	  two	  scenes	  from	  Schindler’s	  List:	  one	  depicting	  a	  concentration	  camp	  officer	  shooting	  prisoners	  (a;	  1:55;	  N=41)	  and	  a	  second	  depicting	  Jews	  being	  killed	  in	  a	  WWII	  ghetto	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(b;	  1:18;	  N=32);	  a	  scene	  from	  Life	  is	  Beautiful	  (2:07;	  N=43)	  in	  which	  a	  father	  is	  killed	  to	  save	  his	  son;	  a	  scene	  from	  Seven	  (5:52;	  N=43)	  in	  which	  one	  character	  tells	  another	  that	  he	  has	  beheaded	  his	  pregnant	  wife;	  and	  a	  scene	  from	  A	  Perfect	  World	  (4:27;	  N=36)	  in	  which	  a	  man	  is	  gunned	  down	  in	  front	  of	  the	  child	  he	  has	  befriended.	  The	  videos	  that	  were	  tested	  for	  the	  Fear	  category	  include	  a	  scene	  from	  Scream	  (6:33;	  N=27)	  in	  which	  a	  girl	  is	  threatened	  by	  the	  killer	  over	  the	  phone;	  a	  scene	  from	  
The	  Shining	  (4:15;	  N=34)	  in	  which	  a	  man	  pursues	  his	  wife	  with	  an	  axe;	  a	  scene	  from	  
Blair	  Witch	  Project	  (3:57;	  N=45)	  in	  which	  the	  characters	  arrive	  at	  an	  ominous	  cabin	  in	  the	  woods;	  a	  scene	  from	  Scream	  2	  (3:35;	  N=33)	  in	  which	  one	  character	  sees	  another	  being	  attacked	  by	  the	  killer	  through	  a	  one-­‐way	  mirror;	  a	  scene	  from	  Child’s	  
Play	  2	  (1:05;	  N=41)	  in	  which	  Chucky	  beats	  a	  teacher	  with	  a	  ruler;	  and	  a	  scene	  from	  
Copycat	  (2:23;	  N=43)	  in	  which	  a	  detective	  is	  caught	  and	  attacked	  by	  the	  killer	  she	  is	  investigating.	  	  	   As	  in	  the	  original	  publication,	  the	  present	  study	  included	  the	  Positive	  and	  Negative	  Affect	  Schedule	  (PANAS;	  Watson	  et	  al.,	  1988)	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  valence	  and	  the	  Differential	  Emotions	  Scale	  (DES;	  Boyle,	  1984)	  as	  a	  measure	  of	  several	  discrete	  emotional	  states	  (see	  Appendix	  I	  and	  D,	  respectively).	  Physiological	  arousal	  was	  measured	  using	  the	  same	  seven-­‐point	  Likert	  scale	  used	  in	  the	  previous	  study,	  plus	  an	  additional	  item	  (see	  Appendix	  F).	  Additionally,	  the	  present	  study	  included	  four	  seven-­‐point	  Likert	  scale	  items	  to	  measure	  certainty	  (see	  Appendix	  E).	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C.1.3	  Procedure	  Participants	  were	  randomly	  assigned	  to	  watch	  one	  of	  the	  12	  videos.	  After	  watching	  the	  video,	  participants	  completed	  the	  PANAS	  and	  DES,	  followed	  by	  the	  five	  Likert	  scale	  items	  measuring	  physiological	  arousal	  and	  certainty	  and	  a	  brief	  demographics	  questionnaire	  (see	  Appendix	  H).	  The	  experiment	  finished	  with	  the	  reinstatement	  of	  a	  positive	  mood	  by	  having	  participants	  view	  a	  scene	  from	  Benny	  
and	  Joon	  (2:06)	  including	  physical	  comedy.	  
C.2	  Results	  	   The	  purpose	  of	  the	  video	  pretesting	  was	  to	  determine	  the	  videos	  that	  performed	  best	  in	  an	  absolute	  sense	  across	  measures	  of	  discrete	  emotion,	  positive	  and	  negative	  valence,	  arousal,	  and	  certainty.	  Therefore	  no	  inferential	  tests	  were	  performed	  and	  only	  descriptive	  statistics	  follow.	  
Participants’ responses to the DES are summarized in Figure C1. The DES 
consists of 43 items that each measure a particular emotional state. The emotions listed in 
the DES were collapsed into 16 aggregate groups measuring more general emotional 
states, which noted along the x-axis of Figure C1. Among the 16 aggregate groups were 
the three emotions to be targeted in the main experiment: Anger, Fear, and Calmness (an 
approximate measure of neutrality).  The aggregate groups were formed by performing a 
reliability analysis (DeSteno, Dasgupta, Bartlett, & Cajdric, 2004) to determine which 
emotional states were likely to be reported similarly.  In particular, we calculated 
Cronbach’s alpha, which is a measure of the internal consistency of a psychometric test 
and, in this case, determines how well the rated emotions covary or group together 
	  	   96	  
(Cronbach, 1951).  Higher scores indicate better grouping. Cronbach’s alpha ranges from 
0 to 1 and a cutoff of .70 is often applied (Nunnally, 1978). We adopt that practice here. 
The aggregate groups were created as follows: angry, irritated, and mad formed the angry 
group (α=0.893); fearful, scared, and afraid formed the fear group (α=0.956); calm, 
serene, and relaxed formed the calm group (α=0.852). The non-target aggregate groups 
are detailed in Table C1. Figure	  C1	  presents	  the	  mean	  subscale	  scores	  for	  each	  video.	  Ideal	  videos	  would	  have	  subscale	  scores	  that	  are	  high	  for	  the	  target	  emotion	  and	  low	  elsewhere.	  Among	  the	  Anger	  videos,	  Schindler’s	  List	  (a)	  was	  rated	  the	  higher	  in	  the	  Anger	  subscale	  of	  the	  DES	  than	  any	  other	  video.	  It	  was	  also	  rated	  higher	  in	  the	  Anger	  subscale	  than	  in	  any	  other	  subscale	  targeted	  in	  the	  main	  experiment;	  that	  is,	  it	  rated	  higher	  for	  Anger	  than	  for	  Fear	  or	  Calmness	  (used	  here	  as	  an	  approximate	  measure	  of	  a	  neutral	  emotion).	  However,	  it	  should	  be	  noted	  that	  it	  was	  rated	  highly	  for	  several	  non-­‐target	  subscales,	  particularly	  interest,	  sadness,	  and	  disgust.	  As	  other	  Anger	  videos	  also	  rated	  highly	  in	  these	  non-­‐target	  subscales,	  Schindler’s	  List	  (a)	  was	  still	  determined	  to	  perform	  best	  in	  the	  DES	  for	  Anger.	  Among	  the	  Fear	  videos,	  Blair	  Witch	  Project	  was	  rated	  higher	  in	  the	  Fear	  subscale	  of	  the	  DES	  than	  any	  other	  video.	  	  It	  was	  also	  rated	  higher	  in	  the	  Fear	  subscale	  than	  in	  any	  other	  subscale	  targeted	  in	  the	  main	  experiment;	  that	  is,	  it	  rated	  higher	  for	  Fear	  than	  for	  Anger	  or	  Calmness.	  It	  also	  rated	  highly	  for	  two	  non-­‐target	  subscales:	  interest	  and	  anxiety.	  As	  this	  was	  again	  also	  the	  case	  for	  other	  Fear	  videos,	  
Blair	  Witch	  Project	  was	  still	  determined	  to	  perform	  best	  in	  the	  DES	  for	  Fear.	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The	  hypotheses	  of	  the	  main	  experiment	  rest	  on	  the	  assumptions	  that	  Anger	  is	  a	  negative	  emotion	  characterized	  by	  certainty	  and	  Fear	  is	  a	  negative	  emotion	  characterized	  by	  uncertainty.	  Given	  that	  multiple	  emotions	  were	  endorsed	  on	  the	  DES	  for	  each	  video	  it	  is	  therefore	  important	  to	  investigate	  their	  performance	  in	  measures	  of	  valence	  and	  certainty.	  Participants’	  responses	  to	  the	  valence	  subscales	  in	  the	  PANAS	  are	  summarized	  in	  Figure	  C2.	  The	  PANAS	  consists	  of	  a	  positive	  and	  negative	  subscale	  each	  consisting	  of	  10	  word	  items	  related	  to	  the	  target	  valence,	  which	  are	  then	  averaged	  to	  create	  a	  summary	  score	  for	  that	  subscale.	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	  was	  above	  the	  .70	  cutoff	  for	  both	  subscales	  (positive	  affect:	  α=0.796;	  negative	  affect:	  α=0.848).	  The	  top	  panel	  of	  Figure	  C2	  presents	  the	  mean	  subscale	  scores	  for	  each	  video.	  In	  both	  the	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  conditions,	  ideal	  videos	  would	  have	  subscale	  scores	  that	  are	  high	  in	  negative	  affect	  and	  low	  in	  positive	  affect.	  While	  the	  Anger	  videos	  generally	  rated	  high	  in	  the	  negative	  subscale	  and	  low	  in	  the	  positive	  subscale,	  the	  opposite	  was	  true	  for	  the	  Fear	  videos	  (with	  the	  exception	  of	  Blair	  Witch	  Project,	  which	  was	  rated	  in	  the	  appropriate	  direction).	  The	  videos	  which	  performed	  best	  on	  the	  DES	  also	  performed	  highly	  on	  the	  PANAS	  compared	  to	  other	  videos	  with	  the	  same	  target	  emotion:	  Schindler’s	  List	  (a)	  and	  Blair	  Witch	  Project	  rated	  higher	  in	  the	  negative	  subscale	  than	  in	  the	  positive	  scale,	  which	  in	  both	  cases	  were	  the	  largest	  such	  differences	  among	  the	  videos	  in	  their	  respective	  target	  emotions	  (see	  Figure	  C2,	  bottom	  panel).	  	  As	  noted	  by	  the	  authors	  of	  the	  original	  video	  database	  (Schaefer	  et	  al.,	  2010),	  the	  PANAS	  may	  not	  be	  a	  thorough	  measure	  of	  positive	  and	  negative	  emotional	  valence	  given	  its	  inclusion	  of	  valence-­‐nonspecific	  word	  items	  as	  “interested”,	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“strong”,	  and	  “alert”	  in	  the	  positive	  subscale.	  We	  therefore	  followed	  their	  suggestion	  of	  creating	  positive	  and	  negative	  subscales	  using	  items	  from	  the	  DES	  (included	  items	  marked	  in	  Appendix	  D).	  These	  subscales	  did	  have	  higher	  Cronbach’s	  alpha	  values	  than	  the	  PANAS	  subscales	  (positive	  affect:	  α=0.845;	  negative	  affect:	  α=0.936).	  Participants’	  responses	  to	  these	  subscales	  are	  summarized	  in	  the	  top	  panel	  of	  Figure	  C3.	  The	  positive	  and	  negative	  DES	  subscales	  were	  more	  highly	  distinguished	  in	  each	  video	  than	  were	  the	  PANAS	  subscales,	  with	  the	  negative	  subscale	  receiving	  higher	  ratings	  than	  the	  positive	  subscale	  in	  almost	  all	  cases.	  Schindler’s	  List	  (a)	  and	  Blair	  
Witch	  Project	  again	  had	  the	  greatest	  differences	  between	  the	  two	  scales	  among	  the	  videos	  in	  their	  respective	  target	  emotions	  (see	  Figure	  C3,	  bottom	  panel).	  The	  ratings	  for	  certainty	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  C4.	  The	  four	  certainty	  items	  that	  were	  administered	  were	  each	  rated	  on	  a	  1-­‐7	  scale.	  All	  ranged	  from	  high	  certainty	  to	  high	  uncertainty,	  therefore	  an	  ideal	  video	  for	  Anger	  would	  have	  a	  low	  average	  score	  while	  an	  ideal	  video	  for	  Fear	  would	  have	  a	  high	  average	  score.	  Participant	  ratings	  were	  averaged	  across	  the	  four	  items,	  and	  the	  distributions	  of	  these	  average	  scores	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  10.	  Among	  the	  Anger	  videos,	  Seven	  performed	  best	  in	  this	  regard	  with	  the	  lowest	  average	  score	  (median	  =	  1,	  mode	  =1).	  However,	  Schindler’s	  List	  (a)	  also	  performed	  well	  (median	  =	  2,	  mode	  =	  2).	  Among	  the	  Fear	  videos,	  Blair	  Witch	  Project	  performed	  best	  (median	  =	  5,	  mode	  =	  5).	  	  	  	   The	  ratings	  for	  arousal	  are	  presented	  in	  Figure	  C5.	  The	  two	  arousal	  items	  that	  were	  administered	  were	  each	  rated	  on	  a	  1-­‐7	  scale.	  The	  first	  item	  ranged	  from	  low	  to	  high	  arousal	  while	  the	  second	  ranged	  from	  high	  to	  low	  arousal	  (see	  Appendix	  F).	  The	  second	  item	  was	  reverse-­‐scored,	  and	  participant	  ratings	  were	  then	  averaged	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across	  both	  items.	  The	  distributions	  presented	  in	  Figure	  C5	  are	  of	  these	  average	  scores.	  Ideal	  videos	  for	  Anger	  and	  Fear	  would	  elicit	  comparable	  arousal,	  as	  arousal	  is	  not	  an	  emotion	  component	  of	  focus	  for	  this	  study.	  Both	  Schindler’s	  List	  (a)	  and	  
Blair	  Witch	  Project	  have	  comparably	  moderate	  median	  and	  modal	  ratings.	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Table C1: Non-target Aggregate Groups in the DES: Video Pretesting 
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Figure C4: Distributions of Responses to the Arousal Items (Video Pretesting) 	   	  
Seven
Arousal: Mean Ratings
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Figure C5: Distributions of Responses to the Certainty Items (Video Pretesting) 	   	   	  
Seven
Certainty: Mean Ratings
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APPENDIX	  D	  
	  
DIFFERENTIAL	  EMOTIONS	  SCALE	  
For each item, please rate the extent to which you felt each state while you were watching 
the video: 
 
[PARTICIPANTS WERE PROVIDED WITH A 1-7 SCALE ON QUALTRICS 
RANGING FROM “NOT AT ALL” TO “VERY INTENSE] 
 
* Item was included in the main experiment. 
P Item was included in positive subscale. 
N Item was included in negative subscale. 
 
 
1. interested  
2. concentrated 
3. alert 
4. fearful * N 
5. scared * N 
6. afraid * N 
7. anxious * N 
8. tense * N 
9. nervous * N 
10. moved P 
11. angry * N 
12. irritated * N 
13. mad * N 
14. ashamed N 
15. embarrassed N 
16. warm-hearted * P 
17. gleeful * P 
18. elated * P 
19. joyful * P 
20. amused * P 
21. happy * P 
22. sad * N 
23. down-hearted * N 
24. blue * N 
25. satisfied P 
26. pleased P 
27. surprised * 
28. amazed * 
29. astonished * 
30. loving P 
31. affectionate P 
32. friendly P 
33. guilty N 
34. remorseful N 
35. disgusted * N 
36. turned-off * N 
37. repulsed * N 
38. disdainful * N 
39. scornful * N 
40. contemptuous * N 
41. calm * 
42. serene * 
43. relaxed *
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APPENDIX	  E	  
	  
CERTAINTY	  SCALE	  ITEMS	  
[ANGER/FEAR]: While I was watching the video: 
[CONTROL]: During the study: 
 
 
1. I was very certain about what was happening (1)  
…  
I was very uncertain about what was happening (7) 
 
 
2. I was very certain about the situation that was presented (1)  
…  
I was very uncertain about the situation that was presented (7) 
 
 
3. I was very certain about what might happen next (1)  
…  
I was very uncertain about what might happen next (7) 
 
 
4. I was very certain about my opinions (1)  
…  I	  was	  very	  uncertain	  about	  my	  opinions	  (7)	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APPENDIX	  F	  
	  
AROUSAL	  SCALE	  ITEMS	  
[ANGER/FEAR]: While I was watching the video: 
[CONTROL]: During the study: 
 
 
1. I felt no emotions at all (1)  
…  
I felt very intense emotions (7) 
 
 
2. I was very excited (1)  
…  
I was very calm (7) [ITEM WAS REVERSE CODED] 	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APPENDIX	  G	  
	  
PREFERENTIAL	  CHOICE	  TASK	  INSTRUCTIONS	  You	  are	  about	  to	  participate	  in	  two	  unrelated	  studies:	  one	  on	  movies	  and	  one	  on	  consumer	  choice.	  	  In	  the	  first	  study,	  the	  movie	  study,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  view	  two	  short	  movie	  clips	  and	  then	  provide	  ratings	  regarding	  the	  quality	  of	  the	  clip	  and	  your	  personal	  experience	  viewing	  the	  clip.	  Different	  viewers	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  different	  reactions	  to	  the	  clips.	  We	  are	  interested	  in	  learning	  your	  reactions	  to	  the	  movie	  clips	  in	  order	  to	  construct	  better	  stimuli	  for	  a	  future	  study.	  	  In	  the	  second	  study,	  the	  consumer	  choice	  study,	  you	  will	  be	  provided	  with	  information	  about	  different	  apartments.	  You	  will	  then	  be	  asked	  to	  select	  the	  apartment	  that	  you	  prefer	  most.	  	  Your	  first	  task	  is	  to	  complete	  three	  practice	  consumer	  choice	  scenarios	  to	  measure	  your	  comprehension	  before	  beginning	  either	  study.	  Please	  click	  “continue”	  to	  proceed	  to	  the	  practice	  trials.	  	  You	  are	  about	  to	  begin	  the	  practice	  trials	  for	  the	  consumer	  choice	  study.	  In	  each	  trial	  of	  this	  study,	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  imagine	  that	  you	  are	  shopping	  for	  a	  new	  apartment.	  You	  will	  be	  shown	  ratings	  for	  three	  different	  apartments,	  and	  you	  will	  be	  asked	  to	  choose	  the	  option	  you	  most	  prefer	  based	  on	  those	  ratings.	  	  To	  demonstrate,	  consider	  the	  following	  trial	  in	  which	  you	  are	  choosing	  a	  new	  apartment:	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Each	  apartment	  has	  been	  rated	  on	  two	  features.	  The	  left-­‐hand	  bars	  show	  the	  ratings	  for	  each	  apartment's	  size,	  and	  the	  right-­‐hand	  bars	  show	  the	  ratings	  for	  each	  apartment's	  location.	   	  
	  	  The	  ratings	  for	  the	  three	  new	  apartments	  are	  in	  red.	  Sometimes	  the	  ratings	  for	  your	  current	  apartment	  are	  also	  displayed	  for	  your	  reference,	  with	  a	  dashed	  line	  extending	  down	  across	  the	  rating	  bars	  for	  the	  new	  apartments	  so	  that	  you	  may	  compare	  them	  to	  your	  current	  apartment	  if	  you	  wish.	  	  Note	  that	  sometimes	  the	  information	  for	  your	  current	  apartment	  won't	  be	  available,	  and	  you	  will	  only	  see	  information	  for	  the	  three	  new	  apartments.	  The	  task	  will	  still	  be	  exactly	  the	  same	  in	  this	  case,	  but	  you	  just	  won't	  be	  able	  to	  compare	  the	  new	  apartments	  to	  your	  current	  apartment.	  	  
	  	  The	  longer	  the	  bar	  is,	  the	  better	  that	  apartment	  rates	  for	  you.	  The	  shorter	  the	  bar	  is,	  the	  worse	  that	  apartment	  rates	  for	  you.	  That	  is,	  a	  long	  bar	  under	  the	  Size	  feature	  doesn't	  necessarily	  mean	  that	  the	  apartment	  is	  larger	  or	  smaller,	  just	  that	  it	  is	  better	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suited	  for	  you	  personally.	  You	  will	  see	  that	  sometimes	  the	  new	  apartments	  are	  better	  suited	  for	  you	  than	  your	  current	  apartment	  within	  a	  particular	  feature,	  and	  sometimes	  they	  are	  worse.	  	  
	  	  Now,	  consider	  the	  ratings	  for	  the	  apartments	  presented	  in	  this	  trial.	  Which	  of	  the	  new	  apartments	  do	  you	  most	  prefer?	  Once	  you	  have	  decided,	  select	  the	  button	  with	  the	  corresponding	  number	  below	  the	  image.	   	  




All	  responses	  are	  kept	  confidential.	  	  1.	  What	  is	  your	  age?	  	  2.	  What	  is	  your	  gender?	  	  3.	  What	  race	  or	  ethnicity	  do	  you	  most	  closely	  identify	  with?	  	   __	  White	  __	  African-­‐American	  or	  Black	  __	  Hispanic	  or	  Latino	  __	  Asian	  or	  Pacific	  Islander	  __	  Other	  (please	  specify:	  _______________	  )	  	  4.	  Is	  English	  your	  first	  language?	  If	  not,	  for	  how	  long	  have	  you	  been	  speaking	  English?	  	  5.	  Have	  you	  previously	  viewed	  the	  movie	  from	  which	  the	  clip	  was	  taken?	  If	  so,	  have	  you	  watched	  the	  movie	  in	  its	  entirety?	  Please	  explain.	  [ANGER	  AND	  FEAR	  ONLY]	  	  6.	  As	  you	  were	  taking	  the	  experiment,	  what	  did	  you	  think	  that	  the	  movie-­‐rating	  task	  was	  measuring?	  Please	  explain.	  [PREFRENTIAL	  CHOICE	  EXPERIMENT,	  ANGER	  AND	  FEAR	  ONLY]	  	  7.	  As	  you	  were	  taking	  the	  experiment,	  what	  did	  you	  think	  the	  consumer	  choice	  task	  was	  measuring?	  [PREFERENTIAL	  CHOICE	  EXPERIMENT	  ONLY]	  	  8.	  As	  you	  were	  taking	  the	  experiment,	  did	  you	  think	  that	  the	  two	  tasks	  (mentioned	  in	  Questions	  6	  &	  7)	  were	  related	  in	  any	  way?	  Please	  explain.	  [PREFRENTIAL	  CHOICE	  EXPERIMENT,	  ANGER	  AND	  FEAR	  ONLY]	  	  9.	  What	  do	  you	  think	  this	  experiment	  was	  about?	  Please	  explain.	  	  10.	  Please	  think	  back	  to	  the	  first	  video	  you	  watched.	  Had	  you	  previously	  seen	  the	  movie	  from	  which	  the	  clip	  was	  taken?	  If	  yes,	  had	  you	  watched	  the	  movie	  in	  its	  entirety?	  Please	  explain.	  [ANGER	  AND	  FEAR	  ONLY]	  	  11.	  In	  one	  or	  two	  sentences,	  please	  describe	  the	  gist	  of	  the	  first	  video	  that	  you	  watched.	  [ANGER	  AND	  FEAR	  ONLY]	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12.	  Did	  you	  experience	  any	  technical	  difficulties	  with	  this	  experiment?	  If	  so,	  please	  explain.	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APPENDIX	  I	  
	  
POSITIVE	  AND	  NEGATIVE	  AFFECT	  SCHEDULE	  This	  scale	  consists	  of	  a	  number	  of	  words	  that	  describe	  different	  feelings	  and	  emotions.	  Read	  each	  item	  and	  then	  list	  the	  number	  from	  the	  scale	  below	  next	  to	  each	  word.	  Indicate	  to	  what	  extent	  you	  feel	  this	  way	  right	  now;	  that	  is,	  at	  the	  present	  moment.	  	  
	  	   	  
Therapist’s Guide to Positive Psychological Interventions52
 Worksheet 3.1   The Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS; 
Watson et al., 1988) 
 PANAS Questionnaire 
 This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and 
emotions. Read each item and then list the number from the scale below 
next to ach word.  Indicate t  hat extent you f el this way right ow, 
tha  is, at the present moment  OR  indicate the extent you hav  felt this 
way over the past week (circle the instructions you followed when taking 
this measure) 
 1  2  3  4  5 
 Very Slightly or Not 
at All 
 A Little  Moderately  Quite a Bit  Extremely 
 __________ 1. Interested  __________ 11. Irritable 
 __________ 2. Distressed  __________ 12. Alert 
 __________ 3. Excited  __________ 13. Ashamed 
 __________ 4. Upset  __________ 14. Inspired 
 __________ 5. Strong  __________ 15. Nervous 
 __________ 6. Guilty  __________ 16. Determined 
 __________ 7. Scared  __________ 17. Attentive 
 __________ 8. Hostile  __________ 18. Jittery 
 __________ 9. Enthusiastic  __________ 19. Active 
 __________ 10. Proud  __________ 20. Afraid 
 Scoring Instructions: 
 Positive Affect Score: Add the scores on items 1, 3, 5, 9, 10, 12, 14, 16, 
17, and 19. Scores can range from 10  – 50, with higher scores represent-
ing higher levels of positive affect. Mean Scores: Momentary  !  29.7 
( SD  !  7.9); Weekly  !  33.3 ( SD  !  7.2) 
 Negative Affect Score: Add the scores on items 2, 4, 6, 7, 8, 11, 13, 15, 
18, and 20. Scores can range from 10  – 50, with lower scores represent-
ing lower levels of negative affect. Mean Score: Momentary  !  14.8 
( SD  !  5.4); Weekly  !  17.4 ( SD  !  6.2) 
Copyright © 1988 by the American Psychological Association.  Reproduced with permission.  
The official citation that should be used in referencing this material is Watson, D., Clark, L. A., & 
Tellegan, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: 
The PANAS scales. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 54(6), 1063–1070.
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